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Dyadic Effects of Feeling Transparent 
by 
Lauren Winczewski 
A wealth of evidence suggests that social relationships and social interactions are more 
satisfying when partners accurately understand one another’s true thoughts and feelings. 
However, most research on interpersonal understanding (empathic accuracy) has focused on 
profiling the most effective perceiver, with very little work on how targets contribute to a 
perceiver’s empathic ability and resulting interaction outcomes. Targets want to be 
understood, but how do their own cognitive biases and behavioral responses help or hinder 
this process? Research on the illusion of transparency shows that people tend to overestimate 
how easily others can detect their innermost thoughts and feelings. Critically, perceived 
transparency can result in adverse social outcomes (e.g., lower perceptions of social support, 
feelings of rejection), suggesting that targets can sometimes undermine other people’s ability 
to understand them and respond to their needs. To investigate this idea, my dissertation 
included two experimental laboratory studies designed to test the hypothesis that when 
targets overestimate the transparency of their own feelings, they are less effective at 
conveying their needs. In turn, perceivers should be less accurate at inferring the targets’ 
thoughts and feelings, thereby hindering perceivers’ ability to provide effective social 
support. In Study 1, I manipulated perceived transparency and measured expressiveness 
during a disclosure task. In Study 2, I manipulated perceived transparency among romantic 
couples and created an opportunity for targets to seek and receive support from their partners. 
Study 1 findings reveal that the manipulation consistently increased expressiveness rather 
  x
than decreased it, and Study 2 showed few significant differences by condition. The findings 
are discussed in terms of methodological and conceptual difficulties I encountered in 
empirically distinguishing perceived transparency from expressiveness. 
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Dyadic Effects of Feeling Transparent 
People have a need to understand and feel understood by others. Understanding is 
critical not only for facilitating intimacy and satisfaction in close relationships (Reis and 
Shaver, 1988), but also for ensuring smooth social interactions. Yet the ability to accurately 
understand others is rather elusive. Research on empathic accuracy, or the ability to 
accurately understand another person’s innermost thoughts and feelings, finds that perceivers 
are most accurate at inferring their romantic partner’s feelings above anyone else’s – yet even 
with romantic partners’ deep intersubjective knowledge and shared reality, perceivers are 
only accurate at inferring their partner’s thoughts and feelings roughly 30% of the time 
(Ickes, 2011).  
Of course, interpersonal perception is just that – an interpersonal dynamic. Although 
empirical research places considerable onus on the perceiver’s ability to accurately infer a 
target’s thoughts and feelings, how do targets contribute to perceivers’ ability to understand 
them? Is it possible that targets behave in ways that make them more or less understood by 
others? In an effort to address these issues, my dissertation was designed to examine one 
psychological processes that might facilitate or impair targets’ readability – namely, targets’ 
perceptions of their personal transparency. I propose that when targets believe their thoughts 
and feelings are transparent to others, they will ironically become less motivated to 
effectively and clearly express their inner states. This impairment in target readability should 
then disrupt interpersonal perception, such that perceivers will become less accurate at 
inferring the target’s thoughts and feelings and less capable of meeting the target’s needs in 
stressful situations. I will elaborate on the following theoretical model in full detail, below.  
Target readability 
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Some people, more than others, are particularly hard to read. One line of research on 
readability focuses on the readability of personality traits.  Due to a variety of factors, people 
do not always behave in ways that effectively clue others into their personalities (Colvin, 
1993). This argument is echoed in the realistic accuracy model (Funder, 1995), which 
suggests that incongruence between personality and behavior is only the beginning of a 
cascade of interpersonal misunderstanding. If targets do not provide relevant behavioral cues 
to their personality, perceivers will not have an opportunity to detect nor use such 
information in forming an accurate impression.  
A separate but related literature focuses not on accurate detection of another’s 
personality, but instead on fleeting thoughts and feelings as they arise in the context of social 
interaction. Studies on empathic accuracy, or the ability to accurately detect another person’s 
innermost thoughts and feelings, emphasizes the role of perceiver ability and motivation in 
making accurate inferences (Ickes, 1993). Although we know that interpersonal accuracy is 
associated with greater perceiver maturity and socialization (Davis & Kraus, 1997), 
researchers have not identified reliable personality correlates of empathic accuracy that 
should map on to empathic ability. That is, there are no consistent associations between 
accuracy and perceiver personality variables such as self-reported perspective-taking, 
empathic concern, emotional contagion, or general intelligence (e.g., GPA, need for 
cognition; Ickes, Stinson, Bissonnette, & Garcia, 1990; Davis & Kraus, 1997; Marangoni, 
Garcia, Ickes, & Teng, 1995). Even gender differences in accuracy are sparse; women only 
become more empathically accurate when they are reminded of the stereotype that women 
are more empathic than men (Ickes, Gesn, & Graham, 2000; Klein & Hodges, 2010). 
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Ickes and colleagues (2000) offer two possible explanations for this lack of perceiver 
variance. First, it may simply be that perceivers have inaccurate “metaknowledge” of their 
own empathic ability, such that merely believing in one’s own ability does not predict actual 
accuracy (Ickes, 1993). Second, it is possible that the proposed associations between 
perceiver personality and empathic accuracy are extremely subtle and difficult to detect. If 
this second possibility is true, it suggests that these proposed relationships between perceiver 
personality and empathic accuracy would be most likely detected in study designs that allow 
multiple perceivers to make inferences about multiple targets. 
To explore this possibility, Ickes and colleagues (2000) conducted a meta-analysis in 
which they subjected relevant data to a social relations analysis. Using a statistical technique 
known as actor-partner interdependence modeling (Kenny, 1996; Kenny, Kashy, & Cook, 
2006), they were able to parse apart variability in empathic accuracy that could be attributed 
to (a) the perceiver, (b) the target, (c) the perceiver-target relationship, and (d) error. The 
relative role of perceiver effects and target effects reliably differed depending on the study 
design. In three studies designed to assess perceiver accuracy using small perceiver-target 
subgroups (e.g., two perceivers making inferences about two targets), the targets contributed 
considerable variance in perceiver empathic accuracy; conversely, perceivers contributed 
almost no variance at all. In three studies where multiple perceivers (mean N = 52 perceivers) 
inferred the thoughts of the same few targets, only then was perceiver variance greater than 
target variance; however, target effects were still significant contributors to perceiver 
accuracy. Across these five studies, targets uniquely contributed an average of nearly 25% of 
the total variance in perceivers’ accuracy, suggesting that features of targets matter just as 
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much as (if not more than) features of perceivers (Ickes, Buysse, Pham, Rivers, Erickson, 
Hancock, Kelleher, & Gesn, 2000, Study 1).  
Interestingly, the empathic accuracy literature is only beginning to acknowledge the 
critical role of targets in perceiver accuracy. In one of the studies included in Ickes and 
colleagues’ meta-analysis (Marangoni, Garcia, Ickes, & Teng, 1995), perceivers were asked 
to infer the thoughts and feelings of three different female volunteers who were video-
recorded describing an emotional life event. Perceivers consistently experienced difficulty 
understanding the one target who felt ambivalent about her impending divorce, and it is 
worth noting that some features of her emotional disclosure are critical for my argument. 
First, this target was difficult to read because she (1) said she was looking forward to the 
divorce, but (2) at the same time revealed that she had many unresolved, conflicting feelings 
about her situation. It is possible that this level of ambivalence made it difficult for perceivers 
to know how she truly felt, let alone for her to accurately report on her inner state. Second, 
perceivers generally reacted negatively to this woman’s story because of her apparent 
inability to confidently end an unhappy marriage that had provided financial security 
(Marangoni et al., 1995). This second pattern suggests that targets may express themselves in 
ways that reduce perceivers’ motivation to accurately perceive them, providing important 
evidence that targets differ in the ways they cue perceivers to their private inner world.  
The take-home message of these studies, of course, is that when it comes to perceiver 
empathic accuracy, both perceivers and targets matter. Although the vast majority of 
empirical work has focused on features of the perceiver, current trends in accuracy research 
examine the unique role of targets in the perceiver’s inference-making. For example, Zaki, 
Bolger, and Ochsner (2008) found that perceivers’ self-reported empathy predicted their 
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ability to accurately understand unacquainted targets, but only when targets rated themselves 
as more expressive. In a related study, Zaki, Bolger, and Ochsner (2009) examined whether 
perceivers would be more accurate when they had access to visual, audio, or both audio and 
visual information when watching targets describe positive and negative emotional events. 
They found that targets who were high in self-reported expressiveness were also more 
behaviorally expressive (i.e., they produced more verbal and nonverbal cues), and perceivers 
were more accurate when they could access these cues using both visual and audio 
information channels. These studies show that targets send important information to 
perceivers, but far more research is needed to better understand how, why, and in what 
conditions targets are better or worse at facilitating a perceiver’s perception efforts. 
In summary, there is mounting evidence that targets differ in their readability. 
However, little is known about how or why they differ. How do targets’ own cognitive biases 
and behavioral responses help or hinder their readability? Although researchers are beginning 
to acknowledge the important role that targets play in the accuracy process, more research is 
needed to uncover the specific pathways through which targets facilitate or impair a 
perceiver’s ability to read their minds.   
The illusion of transparency 
One psychological process that may affect readability is the illusion of transparency, 
or the erroneous belief that one’s own internal states (Barr & Kleck, 1995; Vorauer, 
Cameron, Holmes, & Pearce, 2003), traits and values (Vorauer & Cameron, 2002; Vorauer & 
Ross, 1999), or goals (Vorauer & Claude, 1998) are obvious to others. In their seminal piece, 
Gilovich, Savitsky, and Medvec (1998) proposed that people succumb to this illusion when 
their own inner state is especially salient to them. In focusing on their own phenomenological 
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experience, people tend to overestimate the extent to which others share in their perspective 
of the self. The illusion of transparency thus reflects an “anchoring and adjustment” process 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). That is, people anchor to their own experiences but 
insufficiently adjust for the discrepancy between self-knowledge and inferences about how 
others see the self (Gilovich et al., 1998; Gilovich & Savitsky, 1999; Nickerson, 1999). As a 
result, people assume their inner states “leak out” more than they actually do.  
 Most of the research on the illusion of transparency is focused on uncovering 
individual differences, contexts, or psychological processes that predict felt transparency. A 
recurring theme in the literature is that self-focus or self-evaluative concerns render people 
far more likely to believe that their inner feelings are easily detectable by observers. People 
who are chronically self-conscious (Vorauer & Ross, 1999), low in self-esteem (Cameron & 
Robinson, 2010; Cameron, Holmes, & Vorauer, 2011) or insecure and sensitive to rejection 
(Vorauer et al., 2003) tend to feel more transparent. In self-evaluative contexts (e.g., public 
speaking), people also believe their anxiety is more apparent to onlookers than it really is. 
For example, Savitsky and Gilovich (2003) asked pairs of participants to give a speech, and 
then measured how nervous participants believed they appeared. In line with predictions, 
participants believed they appeared significantly more nervous than the other participants 
(i.e., the “audience”) perceived them to be. These findings are consistent with the theoretical 
assumption that transparency should be greatest when people are especially focused on self-
relevant thoughts (Gilovich et al., 1998).  
 Apart from predictors of transparency, there are far fewer studies examining 
intrapersonal outcomes associated with this illusion. In general, the assumption that others 
can detect one’s own internal traits or states is associated with miscommunication (Vorauer 
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et al., 2003; Vorauer, 2005). In a study on intergroup relationship formation, for example, 
Vorauer and Sakamoto (2006) invited White and Chinese participants to interact with one 
another in a semi-structured laboratory discussion via a live audiovisual feed. When White 
participants had little prior contact with people of Asian descent, those who interacted with a 
Chinese participant thought they communicated more interest than did Whites who interacted 
with another White participant. In the White-Chinese dyads, White participants thought they 
conveyed more interest than the Chinese participants and a third party team of objective 
raters picked up on. Because Whites thought they communicated greater interest in their 
partner than was reciprocated, the realization of this unrequited enthusiasm ultimately 
predicted defensive distancing and a diminished desire to meet the person face-to-face. The 
researchers speculate that these discrepancies reflect an outcome of the illusion of 
transparency: the novelty of interacting with an outgroup member activated self-awareness 
and perceived transparency, which led to the erroneous belief that one’s relationship 
motivations were obvious to outgroup (but not ingroup) members. Thus, the illusion of 
transparency has the potential to undermine the formation of intergroup relationships, even 
among participants with good intentions. 
In the context of well-established relationships with close others, the illusion of 
transparency is especially strong (Cameron & Vorauer, 2008). When individuals feel closer 
and more cognitively merged with close others, they make judgments that stem primarily 
from self-knowledge. In one study, individuals completed the Inclusion of Other in the Self 
scale (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992) to indicate the degree to which they felt merged with a 
particular close other (i.e., degree of self-other overlap). Then, participants responded to a 
checklist of interpersonal dilemmas and were asked to consider the degree to which their 
  8
significant others would accurately anticipate the participant’s course of action in these 
hypothetical situations. When participants reported a greater merging of self with other, they 
reported a greater (albeit incorrect) belief that close others would be aware of their emotions, 
preferences, and behaviors in those situations (Vorauer & Cameron, 2002).  
Although it makes sense that people are especially motivated to feel understood by 
close others (Reis & Shaver, 1988), the few studies on the role of transparency in 
interpersonal perception suggests that attempts to understand close others can be undermined 
by thinking about how others view the self. In a recent study on perspective-taking among 
romantic partners (Vorauer & Sucharyna, 2013, Study 3), participants who were asked to 
imagine their partner’s perspective during an interpersonal problem-solving task became – 
ironically – more self-focused; that is, their cognitions centered on how they thought they 
appeared to their partner. Imagining another person’s perspective was thought to 
paradoxically create more self-focus when the other person is in a position to evaluate the 
self (after all, as mentioned above, people generally feel more transparent to close others or 
to those with whom they feel a greater overlap between self and other; Vorauer & Cameron, 
2002; Vorauer & Sucharnya, 2013). When people consider another person’s perspective in an 
interpersonal interaction, their attention turns back to the self and prompts them to consider 
what the other person is thinking of them. This self-focused state is sometimes referred to as 
the spotlight effect, or an egocentric bias wherein people exaggerate the extent to which 
others notice them (Gilovich & Savitsky, 1999). When people feel they are “in the spotlight” 
or are the subject of another person’s evaluations, they feel more transparent to that person. 
Consistent with this idea, Vorauer and Sucharnya (2013) found that participants who took 
their partner’s perspective did indeed become more self-focused and felt more transparent. 
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This transparency was then associated with less favorable interaction outcomes. In particular, 
participants who reported greater transparency about negative feelings also felt less close to 
their partner and less satisfied with their relationship after the task. This study shows that, 
when situational features lead to greater transparency, transparency is once again associated 
with adverse outcomes.   
If the feeling of transparency has negative intrapersonal consequences for targets, is it 
possible that this illusion also impedes social interactions with others? That is, what are the 
interpersonal consequences of feeling transparent? Consider the role of transparency in social 
support contexts, for example. One study showed that when low self-esteem individuals 
exaggerated the degree to which they conveyed their needs to their partner, they felt less 
supported than those who had accurate insight into how much they actually conveyed 
(Cameron & Robinson, 2010). Is it possible that individuals felt less supported because 
support-providers were actually less supportive? And if so, why?  In line with the speculation 
that feelings of transparency should result in a downward spiral of interpersonal 
miscommunication and misunderstanding (Cameron & Vorauer, 2008; Vorauer, 2012), 
growing evidence suggests that one person’s felt transparency can result in negative social 
interactions for both individuals.  
Dyadic effects of felt transparency 
Arguably one of the more interesting features of the illusion of transparency is the 
consistent discrepancy between what targets believe they communicate and what observers 
actually detect. That is, just because targets feel transparent does not mean that other people 
(perceivers) can accurately discern their true traits or states. Gilovich found that when 
participants were asked to lie (or tell the truth), liars consistently felt that others knew (could 
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detect, or guess) that they were the liars, but observers were no better than chance at 
detecting the liar (Gilovich et al., 1998). In a study on felt transparency of traits, participants 
believed that their friends could accurately discern 70% of their self-aspects; however, 
friends were only accurate 32% of the time (Vorauer & Cameron, 2002). Studies that 
experimentally manipulate transparency tell the same story: when targets were led to feel 
more transparent (e.g., through a self-focus manipulation), observers did not have an easier 
time detecting the targets’ inner states (e.g., Vorauer & Ross, 1999; Vorauer & Sucharnya, 
2013).  
The few studies on interpersonal outcomes of transparency make it clear that much 
more research is needed to understand the mechanisms by which an individual’s felt 
transparency disrupts dyadic processes. There is a clear disconnect between what people 
think they convey and what perceivers are able to detect, and individuals and relationships 
may suffer as a result of one person’s heightened transparency. If people believe (or are 
motivated to believe) their feelings are transparent, why do observers consistently fail to pick 
up on them?  If people believe their feelings are transparent, how does this affect their social 
behavior, such as their willingness to disclose information about their true thoughts and 
feelings?   
Given the various circumstances in which people feel transparent, it is worth noting 
that the intra- or interpersonal outcomes of feeling transparent may be modulated by whether 
people are motivated feel transparent to begin with. Some studies show that people feel 
transparent even when they may not want their inner feelings known (i.e., when they are 
lying, when they feel nervous; Gilovich et al., 1998, Gilovich & Savitsky, 2003). But other 
studies show that people also feel transparent in instances when it might otherwise be helpful 
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that one’s feelings are easily detectable by others. For example, people may overestimate 
how much they are conveying their inner states because they want to be understood and are 
motivated to believe their emotions are “leaking out” to others who may be able to respond to 
them (Cameron & Robinson, 2008; Cameron, Holmes, & Vorauer, 2010). I suspect that the 
negative effects of feeling transparent, such as overestimating how much others can see one’s 
emotional state, may contribute to peoples’ beliefs about whether they are actually being 
understood in social interactions. If people want to be understood but erroneously assume 
their feelings are transparent, they may be all the more disappointed when listeners do not 
have as much insight into the discloser’s mind as the discloser wants to believe. 
Thus, in instances in which it would be helpful to be understood, I propose that the 
egocentric bias of feeling transparent is associated with negative outcomes because it disrupts 
peoples’ propensity to effectively express themselves to others. I speculate that there are two 
ways in which the illusion of transparency is related to expressiveness. First, the belief that 
one’s inner state is obvious may be a cognitive bias – that is, people may be less expressive 
because they believe they already are adequately expressing themselves. Second, the illusion 
of transparency may instead deplete the motivation to be expressive; that is, people may not 
feel motivated to exert effort expressing something that seems obvious to others (Cameron & 
Vorauer, 2008). Thus, the current studies examined the possibility that expressiveness is the 
key link between felt transparency and adverse social outcomes.  
Expressiveness 
 A number of theoretical traditions suggest that people want to feel understood by 
others (Reis and Shaver, 1988), both over time and in the context of specific interactions 
(Finkenauer & Righetti, 2011). Fortunately, people have a number of channels through which 
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they can make their inner states known to others. Via nonverbal or verbal behavior, people 
differ in their ability and motivation to act in accordance with their true feelings, needs, or 
goals (Gross, John, Richards, 2000). Indeed, people high in trait expressivity achieve this 
goal; their use of more affective/emotional language and relevant nonverbal behaviors allows 
perceivers to more accurately detect the valence of their emotional state (Zaki, Bolger, & 
Ochsner, 2009). So, although perceivers must register the cues that targets send, targets must 
also send clear signals that properly convey their internal states.  
 Emotional expression is a key feature of effective support-seeking behavior and 
communication of needs among romantic partners (Reis and Shaver, 1988). In order to elicit 
support that matches one’s needs, support-seekers need to clearly express their thoughts and 
feelings in social interactions (Collins & Feeney, 2000). But if support-seekers erroneously 
assume that their partners can accurately “read their minds,” they may be less communicative 
about their needs and more upset with the support they do receive (Eidelson & Epstein, 1982; 
Vorauer, 2012). For wives, this mind-reading assumption is even associated with more 
hostile behavior during conflict episodes (Bradbury & Fincham, 1993). In addition, it is 
noteworthy that people tend to seek social support when they are feeling distressed and 
vulnerable, which tends to make people more self-focused and concerned about how they are 
viewed by others. This egocentric focus may, in turn, heighten perceptions of transparency 
(Vorauer, 2012) and reduce one’s ability (or motivation) to effectively communicate one’s 
needs to others. For example, if the process of seeking support renders people more self-
focused – and heightens perceived transparency – support-seeking efforts (and outcomes) 
may be significantly impaired.  
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 Given these cognitive and interpersonal complexities, it is surprising that there is 
relatively little research on specific target expressions that most effectively elicit support 
behavior. If support-seekers are met with stressful circumstances that require they 
communicate their needs, how might their nonverbal and verbal expressiveness be affected 
by felt transparency?  I predict that the belief that one’s inner state is obvious to others 
renders people less motivated (or less able) to engage in effective expression during social 
interactions. Some evidence supports the idea that expression can be affected by motivational 
factors.  For example, the literature on individual differences in self-monitoring suggests that 
people modify their behavioral expressions in ways that they believe suit the situation 
(Snyder, 1974). In addition, in a study of facial expressiveness, Barr and Kleck (1995) video-
recorded participants expressing or suppressing their emotional reactions to a humorous 
video clip. Participants and outside observers then rated the intensity of the participants’ 
emotional displays while watching the clips. When participants were asked to genuinely 
communicate their feelings, the discrepancy between participants’ self-ratings and observer 
ratings was small and not statistically significant; but when they were asked to suppress their 
emotions, there was a larger (and significant) discrepancy between self and observer ratings. 
These findings show that targets can enhance their expressiveness – and send a clear signal – 
when motivated to do so.  
 The importance of expression is also implicated in the existing transparency 
literature. As reviewed above, people who feel (or are made to feel) more transparent are not 
any easier to read despite believing they are (Vorauer et al., 2003; Vorauer, 2005; Vorauer & 
Sakamoto, 2006). That is, perceived transparency reflects a discrepancy between what people 
think they express versus what they actually express. Thus, I propose that felt transparency – 
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whether due to diminished motivation or cognitive inability – ironically prompts individuals 
to behave in ways that undermine the likelihood that they will be seen, with accuracy, by 
others. 
Downstream dyadic consequences of feeling transparent in stressful situations  
 There are likely numerous dyadic implications of overestimating how much one 
conveys and expresses during stressful circumstances. If felt transparency both disrupts 
targets’ expressiveness and impairs perceivers’ accuracy, targets and perceivers alike may be 
less satisfied with their social interactions. In the heat of conflict, for example, partners who 
misunderstand each other may be less accommodating of one another’s behavior (Kilpatrick, 
Bissonnette, & Rusbult, 2002). In such emotional circumstances, there is plenty of room for 
error in communicating one’s own feelings or inferring another’s inner state. 
 Miscommunication may be especially problematic in social support transactions 
among couples. If partners misunderstand one another’s needs, their efforts at providing 
support may be misguided. Indeed, understanding is key for responsive behavior and 
intimacy (Reis & Shaver, 1988; Laurenceau, Feldman Barrett, & Pietromonaco, 1998), and 
there is mounting evidence that empathic accuracy is critical to a partners’ ability to provide 
supportive behavior during social interactions (Verhofstadt, Buysse, Ickes, Davis, & 
Devoldre, 2008; Winczewski, Bowen, & Collins, 2016). However, little research examines 
how support-seekers affect the likelihood of eliciting responsive behavior that matches their 
needs. I argue that stressful situations may provide an especially relevant context for 
examining dyadic effects of transparency because (1) transparency is heightened in anxiety-
provoking situations (Savitsky & Gilovich, 2003), (2) support-seekers’ expressiveness is 
especially relevant for communicating needs and alleviating distress, and (3) transparency 
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may ultimately disrupt the support-seeking process if support-seekers assume their inner 
states are obvious. Thus, my dissertation focused on these processes in the context of social 
support interactions in an effort to better understand how the support-seeking exchange may 
ironically undermine support seeking and provision. In future studies, I plan to extend my 
work to examine how transparency impacts other types of social interactions, including 
conflict interactions and positive event disclosures.   
Theoretical model 
My dissertation was designed to examine the complex dyadic processes that are set in 
motion when targets believe they are transparent to close others.  I examined these processes 
in the context of social support interactions among romantic partners. As shown in the 
theoretical model below, I hypothesized that when targets (or support-seekers) assume their 
inner states are transparent, they would be less expressive; that is, they would provide fewer 
verbal and nonverbal cues to their inner thoughts and feelings. With fewer cues, perceivers 
(support-providers) would be less able to form accurate inferences about the target’s support 
needs. Lower accuracy should, in turn, lead perceivers to provide less responsive support to 
targets.  
Overview of studies  
 To test these ideas, I ran four pilot studies (conducted on MTurk and in the lab – see 
Appendix A for a description of these pilot studies) and two behavioral laboratory studies. 
The purpose of the pilot studies was to identify a manipulation of transparency that led 
participants to feel more readable. I had a difficult time manipulating transparency. I 
ultimately chose a perspective-taking manipulation (adapted from Vorauer & Sucharnya, 
2013) that increases perceived transparency because it ironically increases self-focus, by 
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increasing the likelihood that people will view themselves through the eyes of their partner. 
The goal was to make participants feel they were the subject of their partner’s evaluation. I 
used this manipulation, despite some misgivings, for two reasons. First, it was the only 
manipulation that had been validated in prior studies. Second, it was the only manipulation 
(of the many that I piloted) that created an increase, albeit marginal, in perceived 
transparency.  
In Study 1, I capitalized on a controlled laboratory environment to examine the link 
between felt transparency and expressiveness. The goal of Study 1 was to test the first link in 
the model, which argues that greater transparency leads to less expressiveness.  To test this 
link, I first manipulated transparency, then asked participants to write a letter to a significant 
other describing a current personal stressor.  These letters were then rated for expressiveness. 
I predicted that participants who took their partner’s perspective would feel more transparent, 
and this transparency would cause a decrease in objective measures of expressiveness 
(message length, affective language use) in a written message to their partner.  
Study 2 was designed to examine transparency and expressiveness among romantic 
partners in a stressful context, as well as downstream dyadic effects on responsive behavior. 
In this study, I manipulated one partner’s (the support-seeker’s) feelings of transparency via 
the same perspective-taking manipulation used in Study 1 (Vorauer & Sucharnya, 2013), 
then measured support-seeking behavior (i.e., expressiveness) during a stressful situation. To 
examine dyadic effects of the support-seeker’s felt transparency, I also measured their 
partner’s (the support provider’s) empathic accuracy and support behavior. I predicted that 
(1) support-seekers who were higher in perceived transparency would show less effective 
(less direct, less clear) verbal expression during the disclosure task, (2) support-seekers who 
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were higher in perceived transparency would have partners (support-providers) who were 
lower in empathic accuracy and who provided less support, and (3) the relationship between 
seeker transparency and provider support would be mediated by the support-seeker’s 
ineffective communication and support-providers’ diminished empathic accuracy. 
Study 1 
The purpose of Study 1 was to provide a controlled laboratory environment in which I 
could examine causal relationships between perceived transparency and expressive behavior 
during self-disclosures about a personal stressor.  Participants came to the lab and were told 
they would be writing a note to their romantic partner. Before writing, participants in the 
transparency condition were asked to take their partner’s perspective, as this perspective-
taking exercise has been shown to ironically increase self-focus (Vorauer & Sucharnya, 
2013). Participants in the control condition did not receive any additional instructions before 
the writing task. Then, all participants were asked to write a private message to their partner 
in which they described an important personal stressor. These messages were coded for 
length, use of emotional language, clarity, and overall degree of expressiveness. I predicted 
that when people felt more transparent, this illusion of transparency would render them less 
motivated (or less able) to clearly express their thoughts and feelings.  
A secondary goal of this study was to explore whether the effects of manipulated 
transparency would be moderated by individual differences factors that have been shown, in 
prior research, to play a potential role in determining the social effects of transparency. I 
measured a host of personality and relationship variables and explored interactive effects on 
expressiveness.   
Hypotheses 
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I hypothesized that the transparency manipulation would affect participants’ level of 
expressiveness during a writing task. Specifically, I predicted that when participants felt 
transparent, they would write letters to their partner that were less expressive (i.e., have fewer 
words, use less affective language) than participants in the comparison/control condition.  
Method 
Participants. Based on the small number of previous studies that manipulated 
transparency, I expected to find a medium effect size in expressivity between the 
transparency and control conditions. An a priori power analysis indicated that I should recruit 
154 participants (78 per condition) to detect a small to medium effect size (d = .40). I worked 
toward this goal until resources were exhausted at the end of the academic year. Participants 
were 169 undergraduate students at the University of California, Santa Barbara and members 
of the local community who were involved in committed, romantic relationships of at least 
three months. I excluded seven participants. Six participants did not release their data 
following the debriefing procedure, and one failed to follow instructions. Post hoc power 
analyses on this final sample of 162 participants (ntransparency = 81, ncontrol = 81) indicated that I 
had 81% power to detect an effect size of d = .40. 
 Participants in the final sample were 62% female, and their mean age was 19.26 (SD 
= 1.32). The sample was fairly ethnically diverse (36% White, 34% Hispanic/Latino, 20% 
Asian/Pacific Islander, 2% Black, 1% Native American, 5% “Other,” three participants did 
not indicate their ethnicity). The majority of participants were in heterosexual relationships 
(88%). The average relationship length was 19.03 months (SD = 19.27). Participants received 
either $10 or partial course credit in their Introductory Psychology course. 
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Procedure. Participants were recruited via an online subject pool to participate in a 
two-part study on communication using various media. Before the laboratory session, 
participants were emailed a link to a background questionnaire. I assessed a variety of 
personality and relationship variables so that I could explore moderation. Here, I report only 
the demographic data and a summary of findings from my exploratory moderation analyses.  
 Approximately one week later, participants arrived to the lab and were told they 
would be randomly assigned to write notes to their romantic partner using one of three 
media: text messages, a hand-written letter, or an email. In reality, all participants were asked 
to write an email using a standardized online form. To bolster the cover story (and encourage 
authentic messages), the experimenter told participants that the research staff would actually 
send the note to their partner. Participants were seated at a computer and were informed that 
they would write about a variety topics, including personal stressors or positive events. 
Participants ultimately wrote about one personal stressor (something unrelated to their 
romantic relationship) and a positive memory. 
 Before the writing activity, participants were asked to nominate a personal stressor 
that was unrelated to their relationship. They were then randomly assigned to either the 
transparency or control condition. As per the pilot study (see Appendix A), participants in the 
transparency condition received perspective-taking instructions before the first writing 
activity about a personal stressor. These instructions were based off of Vorauer and 
Sucharnya’s (2013) imagine-other perspective-taking instructions, which were adapted from 
perspective-taking instructions typically administered in prosocial behavior research (e.g., 
Batson et al., 1997; Davis et al., 2004). Recall that the imagine-other perspective-taking 
instructions are supposed to create felt transparency when people are in a position to be 
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evaluated by the other person, because in these circumstances, people instead begin to focus 
their attention on considering how the other person sees them. Thus, I modified the language 
of the manipulation just slightly, in the pilot study and in both studies reported here, in an 
effort to (1) more explicitly make the self feel as though he or she is the subject of their 
partner’s evaluation, and (2) to make the instructions relevant to the writing activity at hand. 
Experimenters delivered the following verbal instructions, which also appeared on the 
computer screen before both writing prompts: 
When writing, please try to imagine how your partner will feel about you after 
reading your email. Try to feel the full impact of your email on your partner and how 
he or she will feel as a result of reading your email. Please do everything you can to 
imagine what your partner’s feelings and perceptions of you will be like after reading 
your email.  
Participants in the control condition did not receive any additional instructions before the 
writing activities.  
 Participants were then asked to “write a message to your partner describing the 
stressful event” and could take as much time as they wanted. Participants wrote for an 
average of 3.94 minutes (SD = 2.64). After writing about a personal stressor, participants 
rated the degree to which they felt their emotions were transparent to their partner. They also 
rated their own expressivity in the note by indicating the degree extent to which they 
disclosed information, thoughts, and feelings in the note. These measures are described in 
full detail below. 
 To explore expressivity about positive events, participants were then given a second 
writing prompt. This time, they were asked to “write about your most treasured memory.” 
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Participants in the transparency condition were then reminded of the perspective-taking 
instructions they had received before the first writing prompt. On average, participants wrote 
about their most treasured memory for 4.50 minutes (SD = 2.97). Since I was primarily 
interested in expressivity about stressful events, and to ensure that the transparency condition 
participants were following the verbal perspective-taking instructions, I did not 
counterbalance the order of these two writing prompts. As these “treasured memory” data are 
purely exploratory, I do not include analyses of these data here.  
 To explore the generalizability of feeling transparent on expressiveness, participants 
then read about three hypothetical situations and were asked to rate how transparent they 
would feel if they disclosed them to their partner. Participants were asked to imagine that 
they (1) got a job they were excited about, (2) had to give a speech at work with little time to 
prepare, and (3) were feeling distant from their partner. After each scenario, participants 
rated how obvious their feelings would be to their partner and how easily it would be for 
their partner to identify what they were thinking and feeling. These data are also exploratory, 
so I do not report these analyses here. 
 In the last part of the study, participants were asked to think back to the stressor they 
had written about earlier. They rated whether they had previously discussed the stressor with 
their partner (Yes/No), as well as the degree to which they typically go to their partner to 
disclose meaningful information about needs, goals, or concerns (1 = Never, 7 = Always). At 
the end of the study, participants were carefully debriefed and thanked for their time. 
Measures. 
 Manipulation checks. I checked the effectiveness of the manipulation in two ways. 
First, I confirmed that participants were following instructions by asking them to indicate the 
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degree to which they were focused on their partner’s evaluation of them while writing (1 = 
Not at all, 7 = Very much).  
To assess perceived transparency, I borrowed a measure from Vorauer and Cameron 
(2002). Participants were asked to first consider, in their own mind, the degree to which they 
felt a series of emotion words (see Appendix A) on a scale of 1 = Not at all to 10 = 
Extremely. Then, participants were asked to consider whether their partner would have an 
accurate understanding of their feelings by indicating whether their partner would give them 
the same rating they gave themselves (Yes/No/I don’t know) for each emotion. Felt 
transparency was operationalized as the number of times participants indicated Yes on this 
checklist, or the average number of emotions that participants thought would be transparent 
to their partner. I examined overall transparency across all emotion words (M = 8.31, SD = 
2.61), as well as transparency of positive feelings (M = 5.19, SD = 1.20) and negative 
feelings (M = 2.57, SD = 1.93) separately.  
Post-writing emotions. I measured participants’ emotions after the manipulation for 
two reasons. First, I wanted to explore whether the manipulation elicited changes in mood 
after disclosing a stressor. I also wanted to be able to explore whether felt transparency of 
certain emotions was associated with simply feeling more of those particular emotions after 
the writing task. For example, perhaps participants in the transparency condition would feel 
their distress was more transparent if they also reported feeling more distress after the writing 
task. Thus, after the writing activities, participants completed a brief emotions checklist using 
a 5-point scale (1 = Not at all to 5 = Extremely). I computed two subscales of positive and 
negative mood by averaging five positively-valenced emotions (happy, content, interested, 
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excited, confident, α = .83) and four negatively-valenced emotions (distressed, upset, uneasy, 
frustrated, α = .87).  
 Dependent variables: Expressivity. 
Self-reported expressivity. Using four items, I averaged participants’ ratings of the 
quality of their own expressivity on a 7-point scale (1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly 
agree). Participants rated statements about the degree to which they revealed their thoughts 
and feelings in the email (“In my email, I disclosed a lot of information about my thoughts 
and feelings surrounding the stressful event”) and the degree to which they shared details 
about the event (“In my email, I disclosed a lot of information about the details of the 
stressful event”). They also rated how open and honest they were in their email message, and 
how obvious their thoughts and feelings were in their message (α = .84). 
Partner’s ability to infer own thoughts and feelings. After each writing activity, I also 
measured participants’ beliefs about whether their partner could accurately infer their 
thoughts and feelings from the note they had written using a scale of 1 = Strongly disagree to 
7 = Strongly agree (α = .83). I averaged together their ratings on three statements: “When my 
partner reads my email, it will be easy for him/her to understand exactly what I was thinking 
or feeling,” “When my partner reads my email, he/she will be able to tell exactly what I was 
feeling,” and “When my partner reads my email, he/she will NOT be able to tell what I was 
thinking or feeling” (reversed).   
 Word count and time spent writing. To examine objective measures of expressivity, I 
used the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count software (LIWC, Pennebaker, Booth, & Francis, 
2007) to measure word count in the stressor and treasured memory messages. To assess the 
average time spent writing, I programmed the online questionnaire to save the number of 
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seconds that participants remained on the ostensible email pages of the survey. Because these 
variables were highly correlated (r = .81, p < .001), I standardized both variables and created 
a composite variable representing message length. The results are nearly identical (and all 
correlations with other variables are in the same direction and of nearly the same magnitude) 
if I analyze the word count variable by itself. 
  Affective word use. Using pre-existing LIWC dictionaries, I ran a count of (1) overall 
affective language use, (2) the number of positive affect words written, and (3) the number of 
negative affect words contained in the stress notes (see Appendices B and C for a complete 
list of the LIWC words contained in the positive and negative affect dictionaries separately; 
the overall affective language category contains all words collapsing across the positive and 
negative affect word dictionaries). The LIWC analysis yields a percentage of total words 
spoken in each category. In my analyses of these data, I first transformed these data into raw 
frequencies of the words spoken per category, then controlled for word count. 
 Observer ratings of expressivity. A team of four independent raters (three female, one 
male), blind to hypotheses, coded the stress messages for degree of expressivity. Inter-rater 
reliability was assessed with intra-class correlations (ICC).  Raters evaluated the quality of 
expressivity along three dimensions: evaluative self-disclosure (“To what extent did this 
person disclose their feelings about the stressor?” ICC = .896), descriptive self-disclosure 
(“To what extent did this person disclose details about the stressor? ICC = .903), and the 
overall clarity with which they could understand the participant’s thoughts and feelings (“To 
what extent was it easy to understand the writer’s thoughts and feelings?” ICC = .881). All 
codes were rated on a 7-point scale, where 1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much. The three 
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dimensions were highly intercorrelated (all r’s > .70, p < .001), so I combined them into a 
single composite of expressivity (α = .94).   
Results 
Analytic strategy. I tested for main effects of the transparency condition on 
perceptions of transparency and expressivity in the notes about stressors. I predicted that 
people who felt transparent would be less expressive – that is, they would report being less 
expressive, they would write fewer words, include fewer affective words, and would be rated 
as less expressive by objective raters. Please see Table 1 for descriptive statistics and zero-
order correlations between the primary study variables. 
Preliminary analyses.  In preliminary analyses, I tested for main effects of gender 
and gender by condition interactions on all dependent variables to determine if there were 
any unexpected gender differences that should be taken into account in subsequent analyses. 
First, there were significant gender differences on only two study variables. On the 
manipulation check of perceived transparency, women felt their negative emotions were 
significantly more transparent in their email (M = 3.34, SD = 1.25) than did men (M = 2.85, 
SD = 1.53), t(157) = 2.18, p = .031. In addition, men reported disclosing significantly more 
details about the event (descriptive self-disclosure; M = 5.05, SD = 1.62) than did women (M 
= 4.49, SD = 1.49), t(157) = -2.23, p = .027. Second, there were no gender by condition 
interactions on any of the manipulation checks or dependent variables (all p’s > .230). Thus, 
the effects of the transparency manipulation did not differ for male and female participants. 
Because gender did not moderate the effects of the manipulation, and I had no hypotheses 
about gender, I collapsed across gender in all primary analyses. 
 Primary analyses. All t-tests on the following variables are reported in Table 2. 
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Manipulation checks. I tested the effectiveness of the manipulation in two ways. 
First, at the end of the study, I verified that participants were following instructions by asking 
them to rate the degree to which they were focused on their partner’s evaluation of them. I 
expected that participants in the transparency condition, relative to the control condition, 
would confirm that they were more focused on their partner’s evaluation of themselves. 
Second, after each writing task, I assessed perceived transparency using a validated measure 
of transparency about positive and negative emotions (described above). 
Perspective-taking instructions. To confirm that participants followed instructions 
when they were in the transparency condition, I asked participants to rate the degree to which 
they were focused on their partner’s evaluation of them. Participants in the transparency 
condition (M = 4.38, SD = 1.57) were significantly more focused on their partner’s 
evaluation of them than they were in the control condition, M = 3.63, SD = 1.81, t(160) = -
2.83, p = .005. Thus, it appears participants were following instructions – but did they feel 
more transparent in the transparency condition? 
Perceived transparency. First, I examined the number of emotions that participants 
thought would be transparent to their partner after writing a message about a personal 
stressor. Across conditions, participants thought that 7.93 of ten possible emotions were 
transparent (SD = 2.50). They also believed that roughly 3.57 positive emotions (out of six 
possible positive emotions) were transparent (SD = 1.98) and 3.16 negative emotions (out of 
four possible negative emotions) were transparent (SD = 1.37). 
Contrary to predictions, participants in the control condition thought marginally more 
of their emotions were transparent to their partner (M = 7.69, SD = 2.43) compared to those 
in the transparency condition (M = 6.99, SD = 2.52), t(160) = 1.81, p = .073. When breaking 
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this checklist down by valence of emotions, participants in the control condition, compared 
to the transparency condition, thought significantly more positive emotions were transparent 
(Mcontrol = 3.95, SD = 1.90, Mtransparency = 3.20, SD = 2.01), t(160) = 2.45, p = .015. There 
were no differences in the number of negative emotions they felt were transparent (Mcontrol = 
3.16, SD = 1.39, Mtransparency = 3.16, SD = 1.36 versus), t(160) < .001, p = 1.00]. In summary, 
the transparency manipulation seems to have lowered, rather than increased, participants’ 
psychological sense of transparency (primarily for positive emotions).  
Summary. It appears that although participants were following instructions, the 
perspective-taking manipulation did not successfully create more nor less perceived 
transparency. Although participants in the transparency condition reported being significantly 
more focused on their partner’s evaluation of them, it was the participants in the control 
condition who felt their positive (but not their negative) emotions were more transparent after 
writing about a stressor. So, taken together, the manipulation did not create any more or less 
felt transparency. Although the manipulation checks suggested that my manipulation was not 
successful, I proceeded to test my hypotheses to determine if the manipulation had any 
effects on the dependent variables.1 
Dependent variables.  
Self-reported expressivity. I began by examining differences in participants’ self-
reported expressiveness of their written notes to their partner. I expected to find that 
participants in the transparency condition would be less expressive. Although the mean 
differences were not significant, the trend was in the opposite direction of my prediction. 
Specifically, participants thought they were somewhat more expressive in the transparency 
                                                 
1  It is reasonable to assume that the transparency manipulation may have impacted participants’ 
psychological sense of transparency in ways that were not fully captured by the self-reported 
transparency manipulation check.  
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condition (M = 5.42, SD = 1.05) than in the control condition (M = 5.21, SD = .99), t(160) = -
1.35, p = .178.  
To probe further, I ran separate t-tests on the two components of the expressivity 
scale – emotional disclosure and descriptive disclosure. Participants in the transparency 
condition thought they expressed marginally more thoughts and feelings about the stressor 
(evaluative self-disclosure) compared to those in the control condition (Mtransparency = 5.14, 
SD = 1.30, Mcontrol = 4.72, SD = 1.54), t(160) = -1.88, p = .062. However, participants in the 
transparency condition did not differ in how much they thought they had expressed details 
about the event (descriptive disclosure) compared to those in the control condition 
[Mtransparency = 4.80, SD = 1.54 versus Mcontrol = 4.60, SD = 1.59), t(160) = .80, p = .423].  
Partner’s ability to infer own thoughts and feelings.  Contrary to my predictions, 
participants did not think their partners would more easily interpret their thoughts and 
feelings in the transparency condition (M = 5.84, SD = .93) compared to the control 
condition (M = 5.67, SD = 1.02), t(160) = -1.12, p = .263. 
 Word count and time spent writing. There were significant group differences in the 
standardized message length composite variable (comprised of word count and time spent 
writing). However, the effects were in the opposite direction from what I predicted. 
Participants in the transparency condition wrote significantly longer notes and spent more 
time writing their notes (M = .21, SD = 1.13) than participants in the control condition (M = -
.21, SD = .68), t(160) = -2.90, p = .004. 
  Affective word use. I ran the LIWC analyses in two ways. I examined mean 
differences in the three word count variables after controlling for word count. These analyses 
enabled me to hold the length of the message constant across participants and examine the 
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relative frequency of affective language use, irrespective of the length of the message. 
Participants did not differ in their overall use of affective language after controlling for word 
count, although the trend was such that affective language use was higher in the transparency 
condition [Mtransparency = 8.44, SE = .64, Mcontrol = 7.74, SE = .54, t(160) = -1.21, p = .228]. 
This pattern was contrary to my predictions. Participants did not differ in their use of 
positively-valenced affective language [Mtransparency = 3.57, SE = .46, Mcontrol = 3.48, SE = .39, 
t(160) = -.23, p = .816]. Participants did not differ in their use of negatively-valenced 
affective language, but the trend suggested more negative affect language in the transparency 
condition [Mtransparency = 4.87, SE = .43, Mcontrol = 4.28, SE = .36, t(160) = -1.51, p = .134]. 
Again, this was the opposite of what I predicted. When I re-ran these analyses but did not 
control for word count, these differences all became significant and stayed in the same 
direction (greater word count in the transparency condition, all p’s < .02).   
Observer ratings of expressivity. Contrary to predictions, stress notes were rated as 
significantly more expressive in the transparency condition (M = 4.55, SD = 1.30) than the 
control condition (M = 3.85, SD = 1.11), t(158) = -3.63, p < .001.  
Discussion 
 The results of Study 1 suggest that (1) the perspective taking manipulation did not 
effectively increase feelings of transparency (at least as measured by the manipulation check) 
transparency, and (2) when there were condition differences, they were in a direction 
opposite of my predictions. The manipulation made participants more expressive in the 
transparency condition on a number of expressivity variables – self-reported evaluative self-
disclosure, observer ratings of expressivity, and message length. It is clear that the act of 
taking a partner’s perspective increased expressivity, whereas I had predicted that 
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perspective-taking would create greater perceived transparency and subsequently lower 
expressivity.   
The first obvious limitation here is that, although I had sufficient power to detect 
condition differences, the perspective taking manipulation did not successfully manipulate 
perceived transparency in this study, at least as assessed by the perceived transparency 
checklist. As a result, I was unable to test the hypothesis that feeling more transparent would 
lead to less expressivity.  
One reason why the manipulation failed to create transparency may be that I used a 
writing task in this study, whereas prior studies have used face-to-face interactions. It is 
unclear whether I could move around perceived transparency of thoughts and feelings in a 
writing task. Vorauer and Sucharnya (2013) moved around perceived transparency of 
specific states (positive and negative feelings) after a social interaction, but they did not 
assess transparency of affective states following a writing task, as I did in the current study. 
Although I did not detect group differences in perceived transparency, I found that 
participants felt their thoughts and feelings were readable to their partner to some degree 
(i.e., the means were well above zero). But again, it is still unclear whether perceived 
transparency of thoughts and feelings can be moved around by the manipulation in the 
context of written disclosures in the same way it can be manipulated in live social 
interactions. If people are about to disclose information by sending a message (and not 
interacting in a face-to-face discussion), would they approach this disclosure context 
assuming their thoughts and feelings are obvious to the message recipient? Can I assume that 
feeling transparent to the recipient of a written message would have analogous interpersonal 
consequences as feeling one’s thoughts and feelings are transparent in a face-to-face 
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interaction? It is possible that the effects of feeling transparent in a written disclosure do not 
generalize to feeling transparent in live social interactions. 
Although the perspective taking manipulation failed to increase perceived 
transparency, it did have a significant effect on expressiveness. The perspective-taking 
manipulation reliably made people more expressive. Although this pattern was opposite of 
what I had predicted (if perspective-taking were creating more transparency), it provides 
valuable information about the effects of perspective taking on expressive behavior in close 
relationships. If the perspective taking manipulation did not create perceived transparency, 
what effect did it have on disclosers? Perhaps perspective-taking created a different kind of 
change in disclosers’ cognitive ability or motivation to express their thoughts and feelings, 
which then enabled them to more effectively, instead of less effectively, express themselves. 
One potential explanation that fits this argument would be that perspective-taking increased 
self-other overlap, or the degree to which participants cognitively see the self and partner as 
increasingly similar or interchangeable. Historically, several studies show that taking a 
stranger’s perspective increases self-other overlap (Batson et al., 1997; Galinsky, Ku, & 
Wang, 2005; Galinsky, Wang, & Ku, 2008), and taking a partner’s perspective increases 
autonomic attunement between couples discussing a conflict (Nelson, Laurent, Bernstein, & 
Laurent, 2016). The current study did not use the exact perspective-taking manipulation used 
in these prior studies, because I asked participants to take their partner’s perspective of them 
in an effort to make the self a focus of evaluation. But perhaps disclosers were able to view 
themselves from their partner’s perspective in such a way that they were truly focused on 
their partner’s view of the self, and not more focused on the self as the Vorauer and 
Sucharnya’s (2013) manipulation was designed to do. In their study, the imagine-other 
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perspective-taking instructions ironically increased self-focus because it was thought to 
increase egocentric bias and make people assume their inner states are obvious. But in my 
study, it is possible that perspective-taking helped disclosers truly see how their partner’s 
view them, which then prompted them not to assume their inner state was obvious. Instead, 
perhaps their greater focus on their partner enabled them to express themselves in a way they 
thought would help their partner better understand them, or perhaps partner focus motivated 
them to be more communicative and intimate with their partner. Consistent with this idea, 
preliminary evidence suggests that participants in the transparency condition expressed a 
greater degree of partner focus in the notes, as rated by objective coders. The partner focus 
dimension captured any mention of the partner (offering gratitude, affection, seeking 
proximity, seeking advice), and participants mentioned their partner marginally more in the 
transparency condition (M = 3.42, SD = 2.02) than the control condition (M = 2.89, SD = 
1.70), t(158) = -1.79, p = .075. Taking a partner’s perspective might have cognitively enabled 
or motivated participants to express themselves in a way that they thought would better 
facilitate their partner’s understanding.  
Study 2 
Study 1 provided an initial test of the fundamental theoretical assumption made by 
my model – specifically, that perceived transparency shapes expressive behavior. Although I 
encountered difficulties with the manipulation and was unable to test my hypothesis, I 
learned that the perspective-taking manipulation created more expressivity in written 
messages. In Study 2, I examined whether perceived transparency (using a slightly modified 
perspective taking manipulation) would have the predicted impact on expressive behavior in 
live social interaction.  I ultimately retained a similar manipulation in Study 2 for a number 
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of reasons. First, the manipulation had been validated and shown to be effective in prior 
research involving social interaction (Vorauer & Sucharnya, 2013).  Second, in order to 
compare findings in Studies 1 and 2, I did not want to introduce a new manipulation, find 
different effects, and then be unable to tease apart whether the different effects were due to 
the use of a different manipulation. Thus, I moved on to Study 2, my second experimental 
laboratory study, in which I tried again to test the primary research hypothesis (that perceived 
transparency would reduce expressiveness), but this time in the context of live social 
interaction.  In addition, in Study 2, I also investigated the downstream consequences of 
perceived transparency (and expressiveness) by testing the full causal model in romantic 
couples.  
To test my hypotheses, I borrowed a stress induction paradigm designed to elicit the 
seeking and provision of social support in an unstructured social interaction between 
romantic partners (see Forest, Kille, Wood, & Holmes, 2014). In this paradigm, one member 
of each couple (the support-seeker) is asked to complete a series of frustrating tasks, after 
which they are reunited with their romantic partner (the support-provider) to complete a 
mundane (sock sorting) task.  This mundane task provides the social context within which to 
examine whether a transparency manipulation diminishes support-seekers’ expressiveness, 
and whether expressiveness, in turn, effects support-providers’ perceptions (empathic 
accuracy) and support behavior. Specifically, this paradigm was used to examine (1) support-
seekers’ perceived transparency and expressive behavior, (2) support-providers’ empathic 
accuracy, and (3) support-providers’ responsiveness.  
Hypotheses 
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 I theorized that support-seekers’ transparency would diminish their expressiveness 
and their partners’ (the support-providers’) ability to be responsive. Specifically, I predicted 
that when support-providers were led to feel more transparent, they would exhibit less 
expressiveness. Lower expressiveness would, in turn, predict diminished empathic accuracy 
among support-providers. This dampened empathic accuracy should then be associated with 
impairments in support-providers’ responsive behavior (and support-seekers’ decreased 
perceptions of support). Critically, I expected that the relationship between transparency and 
empathic accuracy and responsiveness would be mediated by targets’ expressive behavior, 
such that support-seekers who felt more transparent would be less verbally expressive. The 
conceptual model is presented below. 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 66 couples (68 females, 64 males) recruited from the 
University of California, Santa Barbara and the surrounding community. Couples (59 
heterosexual, 7 same-sex) were required to be in a committed, romantic relationship for at 
least three consecutive months (average relationship length = 10.95 months, SD = 11.53, 
17% cohabiting). One additional couple was recruited for the study but did not release their 
data after the debriefing. Participants were 19.61 years old (SD = 2.29). They were 33% 
Asian/Pacific Islander, 28% White, 16% Hispanic or Latino, 4% Black or African American, 
5% “Other,” and 14% declined to state an ethnicity. Couples participated for partial course 
credit in an introductory psychology course or $20 in cash. Power analyses indicate that in 
this sample (ntransparency = 35, ncontrol = 31), I had .51 power to detect a medium effect (d = 
.50). 
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Procedure. Participants were recruited via flyers posted around campus and an online 
subject pool to participate in a two-part study with their romantic partner on personality and 
perception. Before the laboratory session, members of the couple were randomly assigned to 
be either the support-seeker or the support-provider. They received an email containing a 
link to one of two background questionnaires (one for support-seekers, one for support-
providers). I measured ten personality and relationship variables (see Appendix F for a list of 
measures) to explore their interaction with condition on the support-seekers’ perceptions of 
transparency and expressiveness. Here, I report only the demographic data. 
 Couples arrived to the lab about one week later to participate in a study ostensibly 
about personality processes in perception and behavior. During the informed consent process, 
two experimenters explained that the goal of the study is to examine how personality plays a 
role in peoples’ thoughts and feelings when working alone versus in a pair. Participants were 
informed that they might be video-recorded at some point during the study.  
 Couples were then separated into two different rooms and were seated at a computer. 
They each completed a brief, identical questionnaire assessing their baseline emotional state. 
 Support-seekers’ stress induction. After completing the emotions checklist, support-
seekers completed a series of tasks designed to induce frustration and elicit support-seeking 
behavior (adapted from Forest et al., 2014). The goal of this stress induction was to create a 
situation in which support-seekers would reveal their distress or discomfort to their partners, 
so that I could measure their expressivity and support-seeking behavior. 
 The experimenter introduced the first task as a “tactile perception activity.” In this 
first task, the experimenter provided support-seekers with a list of 10 lines of text. Each line 
contained random, alpha-numeric text printed in a small, gray font, making the text fairly 
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difficult to read. Support-seekers were told that they would have four minutes to enter each 
line of data into an online form, as accurately and as quickly as possible. The online form 
was programmed to periodically display error messages informing participants that they had 
made a data entry error and needed to re-enter that line of text. Experimenters sat nearby with 
a timer and suspended the data entry activity after the four minutes had expired. 
 After the four minutes, experimenters introduced the second task as a measure of 
cognition and perception. Support-seekers were given a pair of headphones and were asked 
to listen to five 20-second sound clips presented in a random order (loud car horns, traffic, 
nails on a chalkboard, a fly buzzing, and a jackhammer). To bolster the cover story, they 
were given a brief questionnaire and were asked to list the five sounds they had heard and 
rate their enjoyment of and discomfort with the activity. 
 The third and final task was introduced as a “quantitative perception task” in which 
participants were asked to complete difficult GRE-style math questions in a three-minute 
period while the experimenter waited nearby. To make the questions more frustrating and 
difficult to solve, support-seekers were not allowed to use scratch paper to complete the math 
questions. Some participants requested scratch paper, but their request was denied and they 
were asked to continue without it. 
 After completing the tasks (which took about ten minutes), support-seekers rated their 
emotional state using an emotions checklist. These ratings allowed me to compare their 
emotional state against their baseline emotional state, to ensure that the frustrating tasks 
induced a negative mood. 
 Support-providers’ neutral tasks. Meanwhile, support-providers worked on one of 
two activities designed to be neutral or fairly pleasant. They could choose whether they 
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wanted to play a game (“Colorku,” an adapted version of Sudoku that involves colored 
marbles instead of numbers), or they could color a coloring book using an assortment of 
markers. Support-providers were asked to continue working on the activity of their choosing 
until the experimenter told them to stop. After about ten minutes (i.e., the time it took for 
support-seekers to complete their frustrating activities across the hall), support-providers 
rated their emotional state using the same emotions checklist they had completed earlier. To 
bolster the cover story, support-providers also completed a brief questionnaire assessing their 
ratings of the activity they had chosen (e.g., “How much did you enjoy/dislike the activity 
you just completed?”). 
 Support-seekers’ transparency manipulation. After the support-seekers completed 
the frustrating tasks and emotions checklist across the hall, half of them were randomly 
assigned to receive the same transparency manipulation (perspective-taking instructions) as 
reported in Study 1. Just before reuniting support-seekers with their partner, they were told: 
For the next part of the study, we’re going to have you wait with your partner in the 
other room while we set-up for your next activity in here. When you’re with your 
partner in the other room, we would like you to take your partner’s perspective – to 
see yourself through your partner’s eyes. Do everything you can to imagine what 
your partner is thinking and feeling about you while the two of you are together.  
 Sock-folding task. After the manipulation, partners were then reunited in a room with 
couches and hidden audiovisual equipment. They were told that the purpose of the next task 
is to give the couple a neutral activity to complete while the researchers set up equipment in 
the next room. Borrowing Forest et al.’s (2014) paradigm, participants were given a basket of 
ten clean, unmatched socks and were asked to match and fold the socks. In reality, the 
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purpose of this task was to allow participants to freely discuss their respective lab tasks they 
had just completed and to provide a context for the couple members to engage in emotional 
disclosure and responsive behavior. After administering the instructions, experimenters left 
the couple alone and began recording their interaction for five minutes.  
Support-seekers’ post-interaction thoughts, feelings, and perceived transparency. 
After the five-minute period, partners were again separated into two different rooms. 
Support-seekers were given a single sheet of paper and were asked to write all the thoughts 
and feelings they could remember experiencing during the interaction they just had with their 
partner. After this free response, they were asked to complete a questionnaire assessing their 
emotions, perceived transparency, self-reported expressiveness, and perceived partner 
responsiveness during the interaction (described in more detail, below).  
Support-providers’ post-interaction thoughts, feelings, and inferences. At the same 
time, support-providers were also given a single sheet of paper in the other room. They were 
asked to write down what they thought their partner was thinking and feeling during their 
interaction. Support-providers also completed a questionnaire assessing their current 
emotions and ratings of their own responsive behavior toward their partner (described 
below). They were also asked to infer their partner’s emotions during the interaction, using 
the same emotions checklist, so that I could later construct a measure of empathic accuracy 
by comparing support-seekers’ actual emotion ratings against support-providers’ inferences 
of each emotion.  
 Video review procedure. After the questionnaires, I used a validated video review 
paradigm (Ickes, Robertson, Tooke, & Teng, 1986; Verhofstadt et al., 2008) as a second way 
to assess support-providers’ empathic accuracy. Before the video review, both partners were 
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partially debriefed and told that they were being video-recorded during the sock-folding task. 
Experimenters asked both partners for their consent to show them the recording and waited 
for participants to verbally consent to view their recording. All participants agreed to view 
the recording.  
 Both partners participated in the video review at the same time, in different rooms, 
with an experimenter present. Experimenters paused the tape every 30 seconds. At each time 
stop, support-seekers were asked to list the specific thoughts and feelings they experienced at 
that specific moment in the interaction. Support-providers were asked to infer their partner’s 
feelings at each time stop. Over the 5-minute interaction, there were 10 time-stops. For future 
analyses, trained coders will compare the support-providers’ inferences alongside the 
support-seekers’ actual thoughts and feelings. The degree of overlap between thoughts and 
inferences will reflect my second measure of empathic accuracy. Preparation of these data is 
currently underway. 
 Final questionnaire. In the final questionnaire, I ran some checks to ensure that 
support-seekers were following instructions. I asked them to rate the degree to which they 
were focused on their partner’s evaluation of them and to indicate which instructions, if any, 
they received before the interaction with their partner.  
Measures: Support-seekers.  
 Pre-interaction self-report measures. 
 Baseline emotions. To assess and potentially control for baseline mood upon entering 
the lab, participants completed an emotions checklist using a 5-point scale (1 = Not at all to 5 
= Extremely). A factor analysis of these emotions yielded two distinct factors reflecting 
positively- and negatively-valenced emotions (explaining 30.84% and 12.80% of the 
  40
variance, respectively). I computed two separate indices of positive and negative mood by 
averaging five positively-valenced emotions (happy, content, confident, interested, 
enthusiastic; α = .86) and five negatively-valenced emotions (frustrated, annoyed, distressed, 
upset, tense; α = .80). 
Post-task emotions. After the frustrating tasks, participants completed the same 
emotions checklist described above, where 1 = Not at all to 7 = Extremely. The purpose of 
this second assessment of mood was to ensure that the frustrating tasks created significantly 
more negative mood (i.e., personal distress or frustration) compared to their pre-task mood. 
Once again, a factor analysis yielded two factors reflecting positive (38.76% of the variance) 
and negative mood (13.89% of the variance). The positive mood scale contained the same 
five feelings averaged together: happy, content, confident, interested, and enthusiastic (α = 
.89). The negative mood contained seven feelings averaged together: frustrated, annoyed, 
distressed, upset, tense, stressed, and nervous (α = .89). 
 Post-interaction self-report measures. 
 Post-interaction emotions. After the interaction, participants completed another 
emotions checklist using the same 7-point scale (1 = Not at all to 7 = Extremely). Once again, 
a factor analysis yielded a positive emotion factor (38.40% of the variance) and a negative 
emotion factor (13.27% of the variance). I averaged five positive emotions together, 
including happy, content, at ease, enthusiastic, and interested (α = .87). I also averaged seven 
negative emotions together, including frustrated, stressed, annoyed, nervous, tense, upset, 
and distressed (α = .90). 
Perceived transparency. As in Study 1, perceived transparency was assessed using an 
adapted version of Vorauer and Cameron’s (2002) measure. Participants were given a list of 
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emotions and were asked to consider, just in their own mind, how much they felt each 
emotion during the interaction on a scale of 1 = Not at all to 10 = Extremely. Then, they rated 
whether their partner could accurately infer the extent to which they were feeling each of the 
emotions on the list. Specifically, they were asked “Would your partner give you the same 
rating you gave yourself?” They were then instructed to circle a response for each emotion 
(Yes/No/I don’t know). As in Study 1, perceived transparency was operationalized as the 
number of times participants indicated Yes on this checklist, which reflects the average 
number of emotions that participants thought were transparent to their partner on a list of 18 
emotions. I examined overall transparency across all 18 emotion words (M = 11.24, SD = 
4.31), as well as transparency of eight positive feelings (M = 5.30, SD = 1.97) and ten 
negative feelings (M = 5.94, SD = 3.50) separately. 
Self-reported expressiveness. I used five items to assess support-seekers’ perceptions 
of how readable and expressive they were to their partner. Participants rated their 
endorsement of statements such as “I was emotionally expressive,” “My feelings were 
obvious,” and “My feelings were clearly visible to my partner” using a 7-point scale (1 = 
Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree; α = .92). Although some of these items, 
conceptually, appear to reflect perceived transparency and readability, I encountered 
difficulty empirically distinguishing perceived transparency assessed after the interaction 
from perceptions of expressiveness during the interaction. Thus, I conceptualize these items 
as perceptions of one’s own expressivity.  
On two separate items, I also explored whether the manipulation would affect 
support-seekers’ beliefs about the content of what they were expressing. I asked support-
seekers to rate their evaluative self-disclosure by endorsing the item “I disclosed my thoughts 
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and feelings to my partner.” I also measured descriptive self-disclosure using the item “I 
talked a lot about other activities I had to do earlier in the study,” 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 
= Strongly agree. These two dimensions were not related to one another (r = .11, p = .373), 
suggesting that discussing one’s thoughts and feelings about the frustrating tasks was not 
conceptually the same as discussing details about the frustrating tasks.  
Self-reported expressive suppression. In Study 2, I added a measure of expressive 
suppression to assess motivational underpinnings of expression. It is possible that readability 
impairs expressiveness because people feel more motivated to suppress their thoughts and 
feelings. I asked support-seekers to rate the degree to which they were suppressing their 
feelings during the interaction, using two items: “I was trying to suppress my emotions rather 
than show them” and “I was holding back from telling my partner my true thoughts and 
feelings.” Ratings were made on a 7-point scale where 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly 
agree. I averaged these two items together (r = .43, p < .001) to form a composite of 
expressive suppression, where higher scores reflect greater suppression.  
Perceived partner responsiveness. Using Reis’s (2006) perceived partner 
responsiveness scale, I averaged 11 items assessing support-seekers’ perceptions of the 
extent to which their partners demonstrated caring, understanding, and validating behavior 
during their social interaction (1 = Not at all to 7 = A great deal; α = .94). In the analyses 
reported below, I use this measure to explore the dyadic effect of support-provider empathic 
accuracy on the support-seekers’ perceptions of support, so as to have a second perspective 
on the support-providers’ responsiveness. 
Objective measures of expressivity. 
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 Word count. As in Study 1, the support-seekers’ transcripts were transcribed and 
submitted to the LIWC software (Pennebaker, Booth, & Francis, 2007). This variable reflects 
the total number of words the support-seekers uttered in the interaction. 
Affective word use. In another LIWC analysis, I also asked for the same three word 
counts as in Study 1. I ran a count of overall affective language use, positive affect words, 
and negative affect words that support-seekers used during their speaking turns (see 
Appendix C and D for the LIWC dictionaries). The LIWC analysis yields percentages of 
words in each category divided by the total number of words spoken, so I transformed these 
data into raw frequencies of words per category and ultimately controlled for word count in 
primary analyses. 
Words about the frustrating tasks. In the final LIWC analysis, I created a custom 
dictionary containing words germane to the support-seekers’ frustrating tasks. This 
dictionary contained 45 words that support-seekers might mention when discussing the lab 
tasks, including “math,” “sounds,” “buzzing,” and “codes” (see Appendix E for the full list of 
words in this dictionary). As with the other LIWC analyses, I transformed these percentages 
of the total word count into raw frequencies, then controlled for word count. 
 Observer ratings of expressivity. The final measures of expressiveness were from 
objective observers. A team of three female, independent raters, blind to condition, viewed 
the transcripts to rate support-seekers’ expressivity. They first counted the number of 
support-seekers who mentioned the lab tasks at all (Yes/No). They also rated support-seekers’ 
expressivity along three continuous dimensions. They rated support-seekers’ evaluative self-
disclosure, or the degree to which support-seekers expressed their thoughts and feelings 
(appraisals) about the lab tasks (“To what extent did this person disclose their feelings about 
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the lab activities?” ICC = .84). Observers also rated descriptive self-disclosure, or the degree 
to which support-seekers described the details of their prior lab tasks (“To what extent did 
this person disclose details about the lab tasks?” ICC = .91) Finally, they rated the overall 
clarity with which they could understand the partner’s thoughts and feelings (“To what 
extent was it easy to understand the writer’s thoughts and feelings about the lab tasks?” ICC 
= .79). These three dimensions were rated on a 7-point scale, where 1 = Not at all, 7 = Very 
much. They were highly intercorrelated (α = .94), so I averaged the three variables together 
to create a composite of observer ratings of expressivity. 
 I also wanted to get a sense of the overall emotional tone of the support-seekers 
expressivity, to explore whether support-providers were able to use the support-seekers’ 
overall positive or negative expressivity to infer the valence of the support-seekers’ feelings. 
The same three observers rated support-seekers’ negative emotional tone, which included 
complaining, expressions of feeling annoyed, hungry, or tired, or irritation and confusion 
about the study procedures (1 = Not at all negative, 7 = Extremely negative; ICC = .82) The 
positive emotional tone captured levity and positive comments such as expressions of 
affection, jokes, laughter, and singing (1 = Not at all positive, 7 = Extremely positive; ICC = 
.85). These ratings were negatively correlated with one another, r = -.41, p = .001.  
Measures: Support-providers. I obtained a number of pre-interaction measures 
from support-providers for two overarching reasons. First, I wanted to be able to ensure that 
support-providers’ baseline mood did not differ as a function of support-seeker condition, 
and second, I wanted to be able to control for baseline emotions in the event the support-
providers’ emotional state upon arriving to the lab shaped their ability or motivation to be 
responsive. I do not report these data in my primary analyses so I do not expand on the 
  45
measures here. The support-provider data of primary interest are the measures collected after 
the interaction with their partner. 
Post-interaction measures.  
Post-interaction emotions. After the interaction, I measured support-providers’ 
emotions using an emotions checklist (1 = Not at all to 7 = Extremely). A factor analysis 
yielded a positive emotion factor (12.98% of the variance) and a negative emotion factor 
(27.73% of the variance). I averaged five positive emotions together, including content, at 
ease, enthusiastic, happy, and confident (α = .81). I also averaged four negative emotions 
together, including upset, frustrated, annoyed, and sad (α = .88). 
Inferences of partner’s post-interaction emotions. I also measured support-providers’ 
inferences of the degree to which they thought their partner felt a series of emotions, using 
the same emotions checklist (1 = Not at all to 7 = Extremely). As previously mentioned, I 
assessed these inferences so that I could construct empathic accuracy measures by comparing 
these inferences to the support-seekers’ actual post-interaction emotion ratings (see below). I 
made two composite variables of support-providers’ inferences by averaging the same 
emotions that went into the support-seekers’ post-interaction positive emotions composite 
(content, at ease, enthusiastic, happy, and confident, α = .89) and negative emotions 
composite (frustrated, stressed, annoyed, nervous, tense, upset, and distressed, α = .86). 
Partner’s expressivity. I measured support-providers’ perceptions of their partner’s 
expressivity by asking them to endorse statements such as “my partner was emotionally 
expressive” and “my partner’s feelings were very readable,” where 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 
= Strongly agree. I averaged these items together to make a composite of perceived partner 
expressivity (α = .88). 
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I also asked support-providers to rate the content or quality of support-seekers’ 
disclosure by asking them to endorse two items: “My partner shared his/her thoughts with 
me” (evaluative self-disclosure) and “My partner talked a lot about the activities he/she had 
to do earlier in the study” (descriptive self-disclosure). All items were measured using a scale 
of 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree. Responses to these two items were only 
somewhat correlated (r = .27, p = .027), so I analyzed them separately. 
Partner’s expressive suppression. Support-providers also rated whether their partner 
was trying to suppress his or her feelings during the interaction. They endorsed statements 
such as “My partner was trying to suppress his or her emotions rather than show them” and 
“My partner was holding back from telling me his or her true thoughts and feelings.” Ratings 
were made on a 7-point scale where 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree. I averaged 
these two items together (r = .45, p < .001) to form a composite of perceived expressive 
suppression. 
Empathic accuracy. My primary measure of empathic accuracy was adapted from 
Cote et al. (2011) and Gordon and Chen (2013). This measure involves taking the absolute 
value of the difference between the support-recipients’ post-interaction mood and the 
support-seekers’ inferences of their partner’s post-interaction positive and negative mood. I 
computed three measures of support-providers’ empathic accuracy: overall empathic 
accuracy (collapsing across emotion valence), empathic accuracy about positive emotions, 
and empathic accuracy about negative emotions. 
To compute the overall empathic accuracy variable, I took the absolute value of the 
difference between the support-seekers’ actual rating and the support-providers’ inference on 
each individual emotion, reverse-coding all negative emotion ratings and inferences. I then 
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took the average of these absolute differences. Higher numbers reflect greater inaccuracy. 
I used the same method to compute the two positive and negative emotion empathic 
accuracy dimensions. For positive emotions, I took the absolute value of the difference 
between the support-seekers’ actual rating of positive emotions and the support-providers’ 
inference on each individual positive emotion (interested, happy, confident, at ease, 
enthusiastic, proud, content). I then averaged these difference scores together (α = .67) to 
create a measure of empathic accuracy of positive emotions. I used the same method for 
negative emotions (nervous, annoyed, upset, sad, frustrated, depressed, and stressed, α = .73). 
Thus, higher values reflect more inaccuracy in support-providers’ inferences. The absolute 
difference on overall empathic accuracy ranged from 2.20 (least accurate) to .40 (most 
accurate), M = 1.023, SD = .41. Absolute differences in empathic accuracy about positive 
emotions ranged from 2.80 (least accurate) to .00 (most accurate), M = .98, SD = .67, and 
absolute differences in empathic accuracy about negative emotions ranged from 2.43 (least 
accurate) to .00 (most accurate), M = .55, SD = .56.  
To use this measure as an independent variable, I needed to partial out variance in the 
support-seekers’ actual post-interaction feelings. Interpretation of difference scores on their 
own is problematic; if I were to request the correlation between the difference-scored 
variable and some outcome of interest, it would be impossible to tell whether one or both of 
the constituent parts (e.g., the support-seekers’ actual mood versus the support-providers’ 
inference) is exerting influence on the outcome variable (Griffin, Murray, & Gonzalez, 
1999). In other words, the difference between support-seekers’ actual mood and support-
providers’ inferences is confounded by support-seekers’ actual mood. Using the residuals 
helps correct for this problem, because the residuals reflect remaining variance in support-
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providers’ inferences after holding constant the variance in support-seekers’ mood. They 
reflect a “conditional” relationship: holding the support-recipients’ actual mood constant, to 
what extent do support-providers’ inferences (i.e., their empathic accuracy) predict 
responsiveness? To obtain these residuals, I regressed the difference score onto the support-
seekers’ actual ratings of their post-interaction feelings and saved the residuals in two 
separate analyses (one for each valence). These residuals reflect empathic accuracy scores 
that were not contaminated by differences in the support-seekers’ ratings, which enabled me 
to use them as predictor variables in primary analyses. After I finish collecting data from the 
full sample of 100 couples, I will use the video review data as a second measure of empathic 
accuracy in future analyses. 
 Responsiveness toward partner. Support-providers rated their own responsive 
behavior (i.e., understanding, validating, and caring behavior) using an adapted version of 
Reis’s (2006) perceived partner responsiveness scale. Items were modified to measure 
support-providers perception of their own responsive behavior (e.g., “I cared about my 
partner” and “I understood and accepted my partner,” 1 = Not at all to 7 = A great deal, α = 
.91).  
Results 
Analytic strategy. In a series of t-tests, I first tested whether the manipulation had 
any effect on the support-seekers’ perceived transparency and expressiveness and the 
support-providers’ empathic accuracy and self-reported responsive behavior (see Tables 4 
and 5 for a presentation of group means). To minimize experimentwise error, I conducted 
four hypothesis tests on my primary dependent variables. I tested for main effects of 
condition on (1) overall word count, (2) expression of negative affect words, (3) overall 
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expressivity as rated by objective observers, and (4) support-seekers’ perceptions of partner 
responsiveness. Follow-up t-tests of supplementary variables of interest (e.g., support-
seekers’ self-reported expressivity, overall word count, overall affective language) also 
appear after the primary hypothesis tests and in Table 4. 
After testing for condition differences in the primary support-seeker and support-
provider variables, I planned to run the proposed theoretical model depicted in Figure 2. I 
predicted that the perspective-taking manipulation would increase support-seekers’ 
perceptions of transparency and in turn would decrease objective measures (observer ratings, 
LIWC analyses) of their expressiveness and affective language use. In the latter half of the 
model, I predicted that this decreased expressiveness would predict decrements in the 
support-providers’ empathic accuracy. This diminished empathic accuracy should, in turn, be 
associated with less responsive behavior from support-providers.  
Preliminary analyses. Since the support-seeker was my primary unit of analysis, I 
first explored support-seeker gender differences and ensured that gender and condition were 
not interacting to predict any of the dependent variables. Condition was not confounded with 
support-seeker gender X2 (1, N = 66) = .06, p = .801). 
There was one gender difference. Male support-seekers reported significantly higher 
positive mood after the frustrating tasks (MMale = 4.42, SD = 1.23, MFemale = 3.62, SD = 1.32), 
t(64) = -2.54, p = .014. To explore the interaction of gender and condition, I ran a series of 2 
(condition: transparency/control) by 2 (gender: male/female) ANOVAs on all primary 
dependent variables. There was only one significant interaction of condition and gender on 
support-seekers’ perception of their own expressivity, F(1, 62) = 6.49, p = .013. Tests of 
simple main effects revealed that men in the transparency condition (M = 4.84, SE = .28) 
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thought they were significantly less expressive than men in the control condition (M = 5.92, 
SE = .31), p = .013, whereas women did not differ by condition in their perceptions of their 
own expressiveness (p = .304). Thus, in analyses involving self-reported expressivity, I 
control for gender. 
Manipulation check for frustrating tasks. Because I wanted to create a context in 
which support-seekers would be more likely to disclose their emotions to their partner, I 
wanted to be sure that the frustrating tasks created feelings of frustration for the support-
seekers. Thus, I assessed pre-task and post-task mood to confirm that support-seekers felt 
significantly more frustrated after completing the tasks relative to their initial (baseline) 
mood. A paired samples t-test confirmed that participants felt significantly more frustrated 
after the lab tasks (M = 2.71, SD = 1.22) compared to their baseline negative mood (M = 
1.50, SD = .52), t(64) = -9.44, p < .001.2  
Manipulation checks for transparency. I tested the effectiveness of the transparency 
manipulation using two measures that were identical to the checks used in Study 1. The first 
measure was simply a check to ensure that participants in the transparency condition were 
following instructions. The second check, adapted from Vorauer and Cameron (2002), was a 
measure of the degree to which support-seekers felt that each of their feelings were 
transparent to their partner during the interaction.  
Perspective-taking instructions. In one item that appeared in the support-seekers’ 
final questionnaire, I asked them to rate the degree to which they were focused on their 
partner’s evaluation of them (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much). Participants in the transparency 
                                                 
2 In exploratory analyses of pre-task baseline mood, there were some trends suggesting that 
participants in the transparency condition were in a slightly better mood than participants in the 
control condition upon arriving to the lab. These trends were marginal and did not change the results 
of mood after the frustrating tasks. 
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condition (M = 4.38, SD = 1.57) were significantly more focused on their partner’s 
evaluation of them than they were in the control condition, M = 3.63, SD = 1.81, t(160) = -
2.83, p = .005. 
 I also asked participants to think back to the instructions they received before the 
interaction with their partner and asked them to indicate the instructions they received from a 
list (“I was asked to imagine what my partner was thinking or feeling about me,” “I did not 
receive special instructions,” or “I cannot remember”). A chi-square test of independence 
confirmed that participants in the transparency condition were significantly more likely to 
report that they were asked to take their partner’s perspective, X2 (2, N = 63) = 35.47, p < 
.001. 
Perceived transparency. The primary manipulation check was identical to that of 
Study 1 and has the same limitation in that it was assessed after the interaction. Overall, 
support-seekers thought that approximately 11 (M = 11.24, SD = 4.31) of 18 feelings were 
transparent to their partner. Collapsing across conditions, participants thought that 
approximately 5 (M = 5.30, SD = 1.97) of 8 possible positive feelings were transparent, and 6 
(M = 5.94, SD = 3.50) of 10 possible negative feelings were transparent. Next, t-tests by 
condition did not reveal any significant differences on these measures of perceived 
transparency. However, unlike Study 1, trends were in the direction of my predictions. On 
the overall transparency measure, participants in the transparency condition thought slightly 
more feelings were transparent (M = 11.91, SD = 4.53) compared to the control condition (M 
= 10.48, SD = 4.00) t(64) = -1.35, p = .181. For perceived transparency about positive 
emotions, there were no differences by condition [Mtransparency = 5.43, SD = .2.05 versus 
Mcontrol = 5.16, SD = 1.90; t(64) = -.57, p = .586]. Likewise, there were no differences by 
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condition on negative emotions, but the means were in the predicted [Mtransparency = 6.49, SD 
= 3.65 versus Mcontrol = 5.32, SD = 3.28; t(64) = -1.36, p = .180]. 
Summary. Once again, participants were following instructions and confirmed that 
they took their partner’s perspective during the interaction. Although the trends were not 
significant, overall perceived transparency appeared higher in the transparency condition. 
This pattern is consistent with the goal of the manipulation and suggests that the 
manipulation is moving participants in the right direction. 
Primary analyses: Support-seekers. 
Hypothesis 1: Overall word count. In the first round of objective expressivity 
analyses, I used LIWC to assess word count and frequencies of affective language 
(positively- and negatively-valenced) use. These analyses were conducted on N = 57 support-
seekers of 66 total support-seekers. We were unable to obtain 6 transcriptions due to video-
recording equipment failure, 2 conversations were in Mandarin, and poor audio quality of 1 
conversation prevented it from being suitable for transcribing. The LIWC analyses reported 
here are conducted on ncontrol = 25 and ntransparency = 32. 
There were no differences by condition on the number of words support-seekers 
uttered during the interaction [Mtransparency = 425.08, SD = 114.09 versus Mcontrol = 423.72, SD 
=  115.18; t(55) = -.05, p = .964]. 
Hypothesis 2: Negative affect words. However, there was a marginal effect of 
condition on negative affect words in the predicted direction. Participants in the transparency 
condition said fewer negative affect words (Mtransparency = 7.73, SE = 1.03) than participants in 
the control condition (Mcontrol = 10.79, SE = 1.16), F(2, 54) = 3.90, p = .053.  
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To confirm that this difference in perceived transparency of negative emotions was 
not just a function of feeling more negative in the transparency condition, I examined 
condition differences on post-interaction negative mood while controlling for pre-interaction 
negative mood (see Table 4). Support-seekers did not report greater negative mood in the 
transparency condition (M = 1.51, SE = 0.14) compared to the control condition (M = 1.77, 
SE = 0.15), F(2,63) = 1.57, p = .215. Thus, the difference in negative expressivity appears to 
be rooted in the expression of negative mood only, and not the actual experience of negative 
mood. 
Hypothesis 3: Observer ratings of expressivity. A simple count of the number of 
support-seekers who mentioned the frustrating lab tasks revealed that 91% of the support-
seekers mentioned the tasks to their partner. A chi-square test of independence indicated that 
people were not any more or less likely to mention the frustrating tasks in either condition, X2 
(1, N = 55) = 1.44, p = .231. On observers’ ratings of overall expressivity, there were no 
significant differences by condition [Mtransparency = 2.94, SD = 1.41 versus Mcontrol = 2.96, SD = 
1.56; t(55) = .05, p = .958]. Raters did not detect differences by condition in overall positive 
emotional tone [Mtransparency = 2.48, SD = 1.17 versus Mcontrol = 2.19, SD = .98; t(55) = -1.02, 
p = .312]. For negative emotional tone, one trend suggested that support-seekers in the 
transparency condition expressed somewhat less negativity, but the difference did not reach 
significance [Mtransparency = 2.53, SD = 1.33 versus Mcontrol = 3.08, SD = 1.82; t(55) = 1.32, p = 
.194].   
Hypothesis 4: Perceived partner responsiveness. There were no significant 
differences by condition in support-seekers’ perceptions of partner responsiveness, 
Mtransparency = 5.89, SD = 1.09 versus Mcontrol = 5.66, SD = .97; t(64) = -.90, p = .37. 
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Supplementary analyses: Support-seekers.  
Self-report variables: Mood and expressivity. I examined differences in support-
seekers’ self-reported expressivity (overall expressivity, evaluative self-disclosure, 
descriptive self-disclosure, and expressive suppression), objective measures of expressivity 
(word count, affective language use, and observer ratings), and their perceptions of 
responsiveness as a function of condition.  
Self-reported expressivity. On three measures of expressivity, I did not find any 
differences in support-seekers’ beliefs about their expressiveness during the interaction. One 
trend was consistent with the hypothesis that transparency should impair expressiveness: On 
the overall measure of readability and expressivity, participants in the transparency condition 
thought they were somewhat less expressive (Mtransparency = 5.14, SD = 1.38) than participants 
in the control condition (M = 5.46, SD = 1.06), but the difference was not significant, t(64) = 
1.03, p = .308. There was no difference by condition in support-seekers’ ratings of their 
evaluative disclosure [Mtransparency = 5.34, SD = 1.94 versus Mcontrol = 5.32, SD = 1.64; t(64) = 
-.05, p = .964], nor was there any difference in their descriptive self-disclosure [Mtransparency = 
5.63, SD = 1.34 versus Mcontrol = 5.84, SD = 1.57; t(64) = .58, p = .564]. 
 Self-reported expressive suppression. I expected that participants in the transparency 
condition would be more likely to suppress their thoughts and feelings during the interaction. 
Consistent with this prediction, participants in the transparency reported marginally more 
expressive suppression (M= 1.96, SD = 1.04) than participants in the control condition (M = 
1.58, SD = .75), t(64) = -1.67, p = .101. 
Other objective measures of expressivity: Word counts and observer ratings.  
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Overall affective word use. I first conducted an ANCOVA on the frequency of overall 
affective words, controlling for word count. I then examined frequencies of positive and 
negative affective words separately, controlling for word count. On overall affective 
language, there were no differences by condition, Mtransparency = 25.37, SD = 1.56 versus 
Mcontrol = 27.53, SE = 1.77; F(2, 54) = .84, p = .363.  
Positive affective word use. There were no significant differences in positive affect 
words [Mtransparency = 17.55, SE = 1.12 versus Mcontrol = 16.67, SE =1.27; F(2, 54) = .27, p = 
.605].  
Words about the frustrating tasks. In another ANCOVA, controlling for word count, I 
did not find any significant differences in support-seekers’ use of task-related words 
[Mtransparency = 10.31, SE = 1.08 versus Mcontrol = 9.59, SE = 1.22; F(2, 54) = .20, p = .661]. 
Primary analyses: Support-provider. Analyses of the support-provider were 
conducted on measures that came after the interaction. I examined condition differences in 
support-providers’ ratings of their partner’s expressivity, their empathic accuracy, and their 
perceptions of their own responsiveness toward their partner. Again, to minimize 
experimentwise error, I conducted two hypothesis tests on primary support-provider 
dependent variables. I tested for main effects of condition on (1) empathic accuracy 
(Hypothesis 5) and (2) support-providers’ perceptions of their responsiveness (Hypothesis 6). 
Supplementary analyses of condition differences on other self-report variables appear below 
these primary analyses.  
Hypothesis 5: Empathic accuracy. To test for condition differences on my three 
measures of empathic accuracy, I ran ANCOVAS on the absolute difference scores between 
support-seekers’ actual post-interaction feelings and support-providers’ inferences. As noted 
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above, these analyses partial out variance due to support-seekers’ actual feelings; without 
controlling for support-seekers’ feelings, it is impossible to discern whether it is the actual 
difference between support-seekers’ and support-providers predicting an outcome or whether 
it is simply the effect of support-seekers actual feelings that is driving the association 
(Griffin, Murray, & Gonzalez, 1999). In all analyses, higher scores reflect greater inaccuracy. 
There was a significant main effect of condition on overall empathic accuracy, but in 
a direction opposite of my prediction. Support-providers in the transparency condition were 
more empathically accurate (Mtransparency = .92, SE = .06) than participants in the control 
condition (Mcontrol = 1.47, SE = .06), F(2, 63) = 6.69, p = .012.  
Hypothesis 6: Responsiveness toward partner. There were no differences in support-
providers’ self-reported responsive behavior by condition [Mtransparency = 5.99, SD = .75 
versus Mcontrol = 5.79, SD = .88; t(64) = -1.00, p = .319.].  
Supplementary analyses: Support-providers. 
Partner expressivity. Differences by support-providers’ perceptions of their partner’s 
expressivity were not significant, although the trend was in the opposite direction of my 
predictions. Support-providers thought their partners were somewhat more expressive in the 
transparency condition (M = 5.39, SD = 0.98) compared to the control condition (M = 5.04, 
SD = 1.14), t(64) = -1.33, p = .190. 
Support-providers’ ratings of their partner’s descriptive self-disclosure did not differ 
by condition [Mtransparency = 5.54, SD = 1.54 versus Mcontrol = 5.68, SD = 1.42; t(64) = .37, p = 
.715]. However, ratings of their partner’s evaluative self-disclosure were marginally different 
by condition [Mtransparency = 6.26, SD = .85 versus Mcontrol = 5.77, SD = 1.23; t(64) = -1.87, p = 
.066]. Consistent with the difference in support-providers’ perceptions of overall 
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expressivity, they thought support-providers disclosed marginally more thoughts and feelings 
(but not descriptive information about the lab tasks) in the transparency condition.  
Partner expressive suppression. At the same time, support-providers thought their 
partners were trying to suppress their thoughts and feelings somewhat more in the control 
condition (M = 2.03, SD = .99) compared to the transparency condition (M = 1.73, SD = .94), 
although this difference did not reach significance, t(64) = 1.28, p = .207. It is worth noting 
that this pattern is in the opposite direction of the support-seekers’ assessment of their own 
expressive suppression. 
Empathic accuracy about positive and negative feelings. There were no differences 
by condition on support-providers empathic accuracy about positive feelings [Mtransparency = 
.90, SE = .12 versus Mcontrol = 1.06, SE = .12; F(2, 63) = .89, p = .349]. With respect to 
empathic accuracy of negative feelings, the pattern was in the opposite direction of my 
predictions: support-providers were marginally more accurate at identifying the degree to 
their partner’s negative feelings in the transparency condition (Mtransparency = .42, SE = .08) 
compared to the control condition (Mcontrol = .61, SE = .08), F(2, 63) = 2.99, p = .089. 
Testing the conceptual model. In the next phase of my analyses, I was ready to turn 
to tests of the full conceptual model (presented in Figure 2). However, because there were no 
condition differences on the process variables in the model, it did not make sense to test the 
full model when I knew that the transparency condition was not moving around the primary 
dependent variables of interest. Instead, I explored the hypothesized relationships between 
support-seeker disclosure and support-provider empathic accuracy and responsiveness. Thus, 
instead of running the proposed serial mediation model, I conducted a series of regression 
analyses to examine each section of the conceptual model in piecemeal. I first report analyses 
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of the various support-seeker objective expressivity variables (word count, affective language 
use, observer ratings) predicting the three support-provider empathic accuracy variables (see 
Tables 6, 7, and 8). Then, I moved on to the latter half of the model. In separate analyses, I 
used the three empathic accuracy variables to predict the two measures of support-provider 
responsiveness (as rated by the support-provider and the support-seeker, separately, see 
Tables 9 and 10). 
Did support-seeker expressivity predict support-provider empathic accuracy? To 
test the effect of support-seeker expressivity on support-provider empathic accuracy, I used 
five word count variables (word count, overall affective language, positive affect words, 
negative affect words, words about the frustrating tasks) and three observer ratings (overall 
expressivity, positive expressivity and negative expressivity) as predictors in separate 
regression analyses. I regressed each of the three absolute difference scores of empathic 
accuracy (overall empathic accuracy, empathic accuracy about positive emotions, and 
empathic accuracy about negative emotions) onto the eight objective expressivity measures, 
yielding 24 regression analyses. Analyses that used word counts as predictor variables 
controlled for overall word count in the transcript. Because the dependent variables were 
always difference scores, all analyses controlled for the support-seekers’ actual post-
interaction mood.  
The results of these analyses are presented in Tables 6 and 7. Only two regression 
analyses yielded interesting findings worth highlighting here. Word count marginally 
predicted overall empathic accuracy, b = -.001, SEb < .001, 95% CI [-.002, <.001], β = -.23, 
sr2 = .05, t = -1.90, p = .062. Across conditions, support-seekers who used more words when 
speaking had partners who were marginally more accurate at inferring their feelings. This 
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pattern held up when predicting empathic accuracy about positive emotions, although the 
effect was weaker. Support-seekers who used more words had partners who were marginally 
more accurate at inferring their positively-valenced feelings, b = -.001, SEb < .001, 95% CI [-
.003, <.001], β = -.22, sr2 = .05, t = -1.62, p = .112. No other effects of any of the other 
predictors on the empathic accuracy measures reached significance. 
Did support-providers’ empathic accuracy predict their responsiveness? To examine 
links between empathic accuracy and responsiveness, I used the residuals of the difference 
between support-providers’ inference and support-seekers’ actual post-interaction feelings, 
partialling out the support-seekers’ post-interaction feelings. Using these variables as 
predictors, I ran six regression analyses. In three analyses, I predicted support-providers’ own 
responsive behavior ratings separately from each of the three empathic accuracy variables. In 
another three analyses, I also predicted support-seekers’ ratings of perceived responsiveness 
from each of the three empathic accuracy variables. Because support-seekers’ relationship 
satisfaction was significantly correlated with both the support-providers’ responsiveness 
ratings (r = .44, p < .001) and their own perceptions of responsiveness (r = .49, p < .001), I 
controlled for relationship satisfaction in these analyses.  
The beta coefficients from these analyses are presented in Table 9 (support-provider 
responsiveness toward partner) and Table 10 (support-seekers’ perceptions of 
responsiveness). To summarize here, none of the empathic accuracy variables predicted 
support-providers’ ratings of their own responsiveness (all p’s > .58) nor support-seekers’ 
perceptions of responsiveness (all p’s > .46).  
Discussion 
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The goal of Study 2 was to test the hypothesis that feeling transparent would have 
both downstream intrapersonal consequences on expressivity as well as interpersonal 
consequences on partner responses to one’s disclosures. Specifically, I predicted that when 
partners (support-seekers) felt more transparent, they would be cognitively less able, or 
potentially less motivated, to express their inner state to their partner. I proposed that this 
decrement in expressiveness would then undermine their partner’s ability to accurately 
understand their thoughts and feelings and provide optimal support. I interpret these findings 
with caution as I wait for more participants and more power to detect effects, but it appears 
that I generally do not find strong support for my predictions in this study.  
 Assuming the manipulation check is a viable check of perceived transparency, I 
found some very preliminary evidence that participants felt more transparent when they took 
their partner’s perspective. In particular, trends suggest that participants in the transparency 
condition felt their negative feelings were somewhat more transparent (p = .18). If this 
pattern persists and becomes significant in the full sample, it would replicate past research 
(Vorauer & Sucharnya, 2013) showing that taking a partner’s perspective increases felt 
transparency, and in particular felt transparency of negative emotions, in social interactions.  
When I examined mean differences by condition on the objective expressivity 
variables, I found some (weak but trending) evidence in support of my prediction. 
Participants in the transparency condition did not speak less overall, but they did express 
somewhat less negativity (i.e., they used significantly fewer negative affect words, 
controlling for word count, p = .053). Consistent with this finding, it is worth noting that 
participants in the transparency condition also reported suppressing their emotions somewhat 
more in the transparency condition (although this difference did not reach significance, p = 
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.223). Otherwise, there were no significant differences on the other self-report measures of 
expressivity, perceived responsiveness, or any other measures of objective expressivity.  
One unanticipated finding from this study was that the transparency condition created 
less objective expressivity on one variable, but not uniformly less expressivity on the others. 
I did not detect any differences by condition in overall word count, positive affect word use, 
discussion of the frustrating lab tasks, nor observer ratings of expressivity. However, as noted 
above, participants used significantly fewer negative affect words (p = .053) when they were 
in the transparency condition. Upon further reflection, it makes sense that the difference in 
perceived transparency was significant for negative feelings but not the others. After all, my 
study was designed to induce frustration in support-seekers, with the hopes that they would 
then express this frustration. Thus, the expression of negative feeling is arguably the most 
relevant dimension of expressivity for testing my predictions. It is possible that there is no 
single measure of “expressivity” that will change as a function of taking a partner’s 
perspective, and that the emotions expressed are entirely dependent on context or motivation. 
There are many ways to express one’s inner state, be it using descriptive self-disclosure, 
evaluative self-disclosure, or other modes of communication (e.g., making direct versus 
indirect references to one’s thoughts and feelings, expressing oneself using a happy or more 
negative tone). Since support-seekers were taking their partner’s perspective, I wonder if they 
felt that expressions of negativity would turn their partner away from the discussion or 
disrupt their partner’s motivation to understand them and be engaged in the interaction. This 
possibility would be consistent with past work in my lab showing that support-providers’ 
empathic accuracy is associated with marginally less responsive behavior when people do not 
feel much empathic concern. Perhaps support-seekers knew that their partner would be less 
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motivated to support them (e.g., listen carefully, offer validation of their frustration about the 
lab tasks) if they expressed too much negativity. 
The manipulation created some interesting differences among the support-providers, 
suggesting that on the whole, their perceptions of their partner’s expressivity did not map 
onto support-seekers’ actual or perceived expressivity. This discrepancy is consistent with 
prior research on transparency in interpersonal situations (e.g., Cameron & Robinson, 2010; 
Vorauer & Sucharnya, 2013), but the discrepancy was not in the direction I predicted. 
Support-providers whose partners were in the transparency condition thought their partner 
was somewhat more expressive (p = .066) and suppressed their emotions somewhat less (p = 
.207). While I did not advance hypotheses regarding the degree to which support-providers 
would think their partner was expressive on self-report measures, I was hoping to see that 
support-providers would be less empathically accurate when their partner was less 
expressive. Contrary to these predictions, support-providers were significantly more 
empathically accurate when their partner was in the transparency condition. It is interesting 
to see that the manipulation had any downstream interpersonal consequences on the support-
provider’s empathic accuracy, given that they did not receive a manipulation themselves. But 
if support-providers were more accurate at inferring the magnitude of their partner’s feelings 
in the transparency condition (and thought their partner was more expressive), what 
information were they drawing on to make these inferences? Was their partner behaving in 
such a way that enabled support-providers to be more accurate? If so, which behaviors would 
be more helpful beyond verbal expressiveness, as measured in this study? Recall that my 
support-seekers were not any more expressive in terms of overall word count, and, if 
anything, they expressed less negativity. In future analyses or follow-up studies, it would be 
  63
worth learning more about the information that support-providers used to make their 
inferences.  
One clear strength of this study is that I have the ability to examine other 
discrepancies between support-seekers’ and support-providers’ perception of the same social 
interaction. Research on transparency (and in particular, on the effect of perspective-taking 
on perceived transparency) suggests that these discrepancies are the route by which perceived 
transparency exerts negative effects on interpersonal relating. For example, Vorauer and 
Sucharnya (2013) found that imagine-other perspective-taking undermined relationship 
satisfaction via a divergence in partners’ perspectives of the interaction. They found that 
transparency made the partner, not the actor who received the manipulation, report greater 
enjoyment of the interaction than the actor reported. Although I did not set out to replicate 
their particular process model, I do find support of the general idea that the transparency 
condition creates a difference in what support-seekers’ expressed and what support-
providers’ felt and perceived. My support-seekers thought they were more transparent despite 
expressing fewer negative affect words in the transparency condition, and their partners felt 
more positive after the interaction and were better able to infer their partner’s feelings. And, 
with respect to perceptions of responsiveness, the correlation between support-seekers’ 
perceived responsiveness and support-providers’ self-reported responsiveness was only 
moderate in both conditions (r’s = .35, p < .001). I suspect that the support-seekers’ 
expressiveness and the support-providers’ responsiveness would be best studied by modeling 
the convergence of three perspectives (support-seekers, support-providers, and objective 
observers), to gain a more reliable and valid assessment of the support-providers’ responsive 
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behavior. Thus, in future work, I will ask observers to rate the degree and quality of support-
providers’ responsive behavior. 
To test the full conceptual model, I collapsed across condition and conducted a series 
of regression analyses to test each proposed link (support-seekers’ expressivity predicting 
support-providers’ empathic accuracy, and support-providers’ empathic accuracy predicting 
both partner’s perceptions of the support-providers’ responsiveness). In these analyses, I 
found that support-seekers’ word count did matter in shaping support-providers’ empathic 
accuracy: when support-seekers spoke more words overall, their partner was marginally more 
accurate at inferring the magnitude of the support-seekers’ thoughts and feelings (i.e., the 
difference between support-providers’ inferences and support-seekers’ actual mood was 
smaller). This pattern is promising because it supports prior research and theorizing (e.g., 
Ickes et al., 1990) that the support-seekers’ expressivity (and not merely their beliefs about 
their own expressivity) should enable support-providers to more accurately understand them. 
However, the various measures of support-providers’ empathic accuracy did not predict their 
self-reported responsiveness nor the support-seekers’ reports of their responsiveness. 
It is worth considering why the findings of Study 2 are so distinct from those of Study 
1. It is unclear to me which of the two studies offers the “correct” story. Recall that, in Study 
1, the transparency condition created significantly more expressivity on a number of self-
report and objective expressivity variables, which was opposite of my prediction. In Study 2, 
I find some trends that look more consistent with my predictions. Although I did not see 
reliable differences in most key measures of objective expressivity (word count, observer 
ratings of expressivity), I did see that perspective-taking created fewer expressions of 
negative affect. So, why do the findings look so much different from Study 1 to Study 2? As 
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previously mentioned, I suspect that the process of taking a partner’s perspective (and feeling 
transparent) has different implications for self-disclosure during social interactions rather 
than self-disclosure in a written message. Perhaps participants in Study 1 were more 
motivated to disclose their thoughts and feelings in a way that enabled their partner to better 
understand them, via self-disclosure in an email, because the very nature of the email 
disclosure limits support-seekers’ ability to fully express themselves. It is also worth noting 
that the writing task built in an opportunity for participants to edit their disclosures and be 
more mindful of what they were expressing and how they were doing so. Further, I explicitly 
asked participants in Study 1 to write about a personal stressor, which may have removed 
some variability in whether or not they would have chosen to disclose the stressor to begin 
with. In contrast, in Study 2, I did not require support-seekers to disclose any particular topic; 
I reunited them with their partner and observed their discussion as it progressed naturally. In 
the context of a live social interaction, I suspect I had a better chance of detecting the 
proposed relationships between transparency, expression, and support-provider responses. It 
is in this context that people are probably more likely to feel transparent to begin with, and 
the consequences on expression should be both easier to detect and all the more likely when 
another person is actually participating in the discussion. I am hopeful that the trends in this 
study will become significant when I analyze the full sample. 
Moving forward, I am considering a number of future analyses that may shed light on 
why I failed to find support for my conceptual model. For example, I need to take a deeper 
look at the reasons why support-providers’ empathic accuracy was unrelated to their 
responsive behavior. It is possible that I will replicate my own research showing that the link 
between empathic accuracy and responsiveness is fully conditional on the degree to which 
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support-providers also feel empathic concern for their partner (Winczewski, Bowen, & 
Collins, 2016). Fortunately, I will have a number of ways to examine empathic accuracy in 
the full sample; I could examine within-couple links between actual feelings and inferences 
using multi-level modeling (e.g., Zaki et al., 2008) or I could use the traditional 
operationalization of empathic accuracy by using data I obtained from the video review 
procedure (Ickes, Robertson, Tooke, & Teng, 1986). That is, I could take the support-
seekers’ own thoughts and feelings they reported while watching the video-recording of their 
interaction and compare them against the support-providers inferences of each of those 
thoughts and feelings. This conceptualization of empathic accuracy would allow me to 
broaden my analysis of empathic accuracy beyond the degree of discrepancy between the 
magnitude support-seekers’ actual feelings and support-providers’ inferences, as I 
operationalized empathic accuracy in this study. Perhaps transparency makes people think 
that their thoughts (separate from the magnitude of their feelings) are also easily readable, 
which could itself create a downward spiral of miscommunication and less perceived 
responsiveness. Of course, the measure of empathic accuracy that I am obtaining from the 
video review procedure is not free of its own methodological limitations – but I wonder if I 
am missing an important part of the story if I am not yet able to examine accuracy about 
support-seekers’ more substantive thoughts and feelings as they occurred during the 
interaction. 
General Discussion 
 The overarching goal of my dissertation was to examine a cognitive bias that may 
disrupt support-seeking behavior. I focused on perceived transparency, or the belief that 
one’s thoughts and feelings are obvious to others. The majority of studies on perceived 
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transparency were conducted in the context of feeling transparent to strangers, and they 
consistently show that feeling transparent has negative consequences. For example, people 
experience negative adverse interpersonal outcomes when they feel transparent to outgroup 
members (Vorauer, Martens, & Sasaki, 2009), people in an audience (Savitsky & Gilovich, 
2003), or a new romantic interest (Vorauer et al., 2003). My study was one of the few to 
extend these processes to the close relationships domain, wherein I could examine 
intrapersonal and interpersonal effects of feeling transparent. In Study 1, I attempted to 
manipulate perceived transparency and gave participants an opportunity to disclose a stressor 
to their partner via email. I tested the hypothesis that feeling transparent leads to negative 
outcomes because it undermines expressiveness, or the quality with which people (in this 
case, support-seekers) reveal their true thoughts and feelings. In Study 2, I examined the 
downstream effects of transparency and expressiveness in an experimental study of romantic 
couples. I hypothesized that support-seekers’ felt transparency and diminished expressivity 
would have interpersonal consequences, such that partners (support-providers) would be less 
able to accurately infer their partner’s thoughts and feelings and therefore less able to provide 
optimal support in response to the support-seekers’ disclosure. Across these two studies, I did 
not find evidence that the manipulation created more perceived transparency (although there 
was a promising trend in Study 2). As a result, I feel that I was unable to adequately test my 
hypotheses. 
 It is important to consider why the manipulation failed to create perceived 
transparency. The manipulation was based off of a recent study (Vorauer & Sucharnya, 
2013), which found that the process of imagining a partner’s perspective ironically created 
more self-focus and a greater degree of egocentric bias in romantic couples working on a 
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problem-solving activity. Theoretically, imagine-other perspective-taking is thought to make 
people more fixed on the listener’s evaluation of them, such that people exaggerate the 
degree to which others have accurate insight into their own internal state. By focusing on 
another person’s perspective, they instead become more focused on the other person’s 
perspective of the self, leading to a host of negative interpersonal outcomes such as outgroup 
derogation, decrements in state relationship satisfaction, and anxiety and embarrassment.  
After conducting two studies using this manipulation, I do not believe the 
manipulation had the intended effect in creating more perceived transparency. In Study 1, the 
manipulation made people marginally less transparent and at the same time more expressive 
on a number of self-reported and objective expressivity measures. In Study 2, there was some 
movement in the predicted direction; namely, trends suggest that support-seekers who took 
their partner’s perspective felt somewhat more transparent and they expressed less negativity. 
Unfortunately, the effects were weak and most were not significant. I admit I had a lot of 
difficulty finding a reliable manipulation of perceived transparency. In pilot testing, I tried 
four different manipulations. The only one that yielded any effects was the Vorauer and 
Sucharnya (2013) perspective-taking manipulation. However, I knew that the manipulation 
was somewhat risky, because it did not uniformly create perceived transparency across 
contexts tested in the pilot study; it only created marginally more perceived transparency 
after participants wrote about a recent treasured memory, but not after writing about a 
personal stressor (which was the focus of my dissertation studies). At the same time, I felt 
that this manipulation was the best option given the results of several pilot studies, given that 
it had been successful in prior research, and given my time constraints.  In future studies, I 
plan to explore additional methods of creating transparency in the laboratory. 
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Another methodological limitation of the manipulation is that the manipulation check, 
or the count of the number of emotions that were transparent to the partner, was assessed 
after the writing task (Study 1) and after their interaction (Study 2). It is possible that people 
simply felt more transparent because they were reflecting back on what they had actually 
expressed in their messages or their interaction. Consistent with this idea, participants’ 
perceived transparency was correlated with their actual mood ratings following the writing 
task in Study 1 and after the social interaction in Study 2. If people were feeling more 
transparent after expressing emotions to their partner, regardless of condition, I have no way 
of knowing if the manipulation itself actually created more perceived transparency. It is 
entirely possible that participants based their ratings of perceived transparency on their own 
expressivity, using their own behavior (i.e., their written disclosure or their expressivity in 
the interaction with their partner) as evidence that they were transparent. In this way, it 
would not be unreasonable to argue that the transparency manipulation check is simply 
another measure of the support-seeker’s perception of his or her own expressivity – people in 
either condition might feel more transparent if they were actually more expressive. This 
particular methodological limitation did not even occur to me until I had started running 
Study 2, when I was supervising an undergraduate who was testing other hypotheses in these 
data. The original study that developed this paradigm also suffered from this same issue, in 
that they measured perceived transparency after a social interaction took place. Vorauer and 
Sucharnya (2013) found that imagine-other instructions increased transparency, which could 
be a clue that participants in the imagine-other condition were more expressive and thus felt 
more transparent. A better manipulation check would be one that comes immediately after 
the manipulation but before the writing or the interaction.  Of course, on the other hand, it 
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might seem odd to participants if I were to measure these perceptions immediately after 
delivering special perspective-taking instructions; participants may become more explicitly 
aware that the perspective-taking instructions were designed to play some critical role in 
testing some hypothesis. It would be especially difficult to measure perceived transparency 
after delivering the perspective-taking instructions in Study 2, because experimenters 
delivered the perspective-taking instructions immediately before the interaction. It would be 
strange to deliver these three sentences and then ask participants to rate the extent to which 
they felt readable.  Thus, in future research, it will be important to develop alternative 
methods for detecting disclosers psychological sense of transparency prior to given them a 
disclosure opportunity.    
 Although I have misgivings about the manipulation used in the current studies, it is 
difficult to know how best to effectively manipulate transparency in future studies. I tried a 
number of strategies in the pilot studies (see Appendix A). Specifically, in addition to the 
perspective-taking manipulation, (1) I gave people false feedback that they were transparent, 
(2) I wrote a questionnaire to lead people to feel they are transparent, and (3) I wrote a mock 
New York Times article describing a common cognitive bias (the “illusion of transparency”) 
that makes people underestimate how much their thoughts and feelings are obvious to others. 
None of these manipulations created higher levels of perceived transparency.  I had also 
considered manipulating transparency via increasing self-awareness, as in the classic 
objective self-awareness studies (e.g., Wicklund & Duval, 1971), where researchers covertly 
manipulated self-awareness by placing a mirror or a video camera in front of participants 
while they completed questionnaires. I did not go this route because I am not sure that self-
awareness per se would be conceptually the same as increasing the illusion of transparency, 
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even if self-awareness and transparency are similar because they both deal with self-focus. 
Further, Stephenson and Wicklund (1984) found that self-focus in one person acts as a 
contagion in interpersonal situations and creates more self-focus in another person. If these 
effects were to generalize to my couples, the implication would be that self-focused support-
seekers, in the absence of trying to take their partner’s perspective, might impair the support-
providers’ ability to attend to them and be responsive. That said, self-awareness might serve 
as an alternative, or even more rudimentary, cognitive bias through which peoples’ attempts 
to express themselves are disrupted by being less able to focus outward and effectively 
express one’s needs. Feeling transparent, alternatively, occurs when peoples’ attempts to take 
another’s perspective makes them instead think about how they themselves appear to the 
other person. In these studies, I was less interested in self-focus per se and more on the 
implication of thinking one’s thoughts are obvious when they are not. 
 If I assume the manipulation created transparency and I simply did not adequately 
measure it with my manipulation checks, I would conclude that my model and hypothesis 
were incorrect and that transparency is doing something else altogether. Alternatively, there 
might be other explanatory processes in play, apart from transparency, that are exerting 
effects on expressiveness. In a review chapter, Vorauer (2012) argues that two key variables 
should modulate whether imagine-other perspective-taking creates positive versus negative 
outcomes. First, perspective-taking is likely to promote positive outcomes (prosocial 
behavior, smoother interactions) when the potential for evaluation by the other person is 
relatively low. But perspective-taking is said to promote negative interaction outcomes when 
the potential for evaluation by the target is high and thus leads people to reflect their attention 
back onto the self. It is possible that taking a close other’s perspective does not first create 
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transparency but instead has effects on outcomes because it more directly motivates people to 
be more expressive. In the context of close relationships, romantic partners have considerable 
prior knowledge about the self, making the potential for evaluation increasingly high as 
relationships become more intimate (Vorauer & Cameron, 2002; Vorauer & Sucharnya, 
2013). But in my studies, exploratory analyses of self-other overlap show quite different 
effects on transparency and expressivity. In Study 1, for example, I found evidence in the 
opposite pattern of my prediction, namely that the transparency condition increased 
expressivity in an email disclosure rather than decreasing it. I suspected that this increase 
may be due to perspective-taking increasing the degree of cognitive self-other overlap 
between support-seekers and their partners, so I added a measure of self-other overlap after 
the social interaction in Study 2. In exploratory analyses, I learned that perspective-taking did 
not create more self-other merging (i.e., there was no main effect of condition on self-other 
overlap). But correlational analyses suggest that, in the transparency condition only, there 
was a significant, positive link between self-other merging and expressivity (both self-
reported expressivity and objective expressivity), controlling for self-other overlap assessed 
in the background questionnaire. In other words, participants who were in the transparency 
condition and who also felt more merged with their partner after the interaction also felt 
significantly more transparent and were more expressive. Thus, I wonder if the perspective-
taking instructions could still be creating a cognitive bias that may disrupt expressivity, but 
that self-other merging undoes this effect and enables (or motivates) support-seekers to 
express themselves in a way that would help their partner understand them. I am interested in 
disentangling the conditions in which perspective-taking prompts more versus less 
expressiveness, especially given the critical role of expressivity in support-seeking behavior. 
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Support-seeking is undoubtedly a context in which the potential for evaluation is high, but 
participants may be all the more motivated to convey themselves in a way their partner 
would best understand them if they are in close, satisfying relationships and feel safe 
revealing their vulnerabilities. 
 Returning to the overarching goal of my studies, I hope my data will reveal critical 
processes through which support-seekers ask for support. Few studies examine actual 
support-seeking behavior in social interactions, and I hope to learn something valuable about 
the ways that support-seekers shape the quality of support they receive. As mentioned above, 
my future analyses could hone in on other ways that support-seekers were expressing 
themselves. For example, I want to explore why the perspective-taking manipulation helped 
support-providers become more empathically accurate in Study 2. This finding is especially 
interesting to me given that support-seekers were not any more verbally expressive and were 
not rated as more expressive. If anything, they used fewer negative affect words in the 
transparency condition. If not the support-seekers’ verbal expression, what information were 
support-providers using to make these relatively accurate inferences about their partner? If 
support-seekers’ verbal expressivity did not predict their partner’s empathic accuracy, I 
suspect their nonverbal behavior must be playing a greater role in expression than I 
previously anticipated. Some preliminary evidence from one key study on the role of target 
expressivity in perceivers’ empathic accuracy supports this assertion. Zaki, Bolger, and 
Ochsner (2009) tested whether different forms of affective cues, either visual (behavioral) 
cues or verbal cues to a target’s feelings about positive and negative events, helped 
perceivers accurately infer the target’s feelings. The researchers varied whether perceivers 
were able to view the video recording (thereby giving them access to the target’s visual 
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affective cues) or whether they were able to listen to the audio recording (giving them access 
to verbal cues only). When perceivers were trying to understand positive feelings, targets’ 
trait expressivity marginally predicted perceiver accuracy in the sound-only condition. When 
perceivers were trying to understand negative feelings, target expressivity predicted more 
perceiver empathic accuracy in the visual-only condition. This study suggests that support-
seekers are more expressive via some channels (e.g., visual versus auditory) depending on 
what they are disclosing, or it could be that support-providers draw on different sources of 
information to infer positive and negative feelings. If targets’ visual affective cues enable 
perceivers to better understand them, then it is possible that support-seekers were behaving in 
ways that helped support-providers infer the magnitude of their feelings. This possibility 
presents another reason to code the videotapes for nonverbal support-seeking behavior, in 
addition to coding for the support-providers’ responsive behavior. 
 In closing, research on support-seeking behavior and the role of the discloser is 
under-studied in the social support and close relationships literature. People have a need to 
feel understood by close others, but the complexities of cognition and motivation in support-
seeking interactions may cause people to overlook the ways in which they express thoughts 
and feelings. I attempted to highlight the effect of one such complexity, the illusion of 
transparency, in disclosing one’s thoughts and feelings. In future studies, I hope to examine 
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         Table 1 
  
         Study 1 Bivariate Correlations and Descriptive Statistics for Primary Dependent Variables. 
  1   2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Mean SD 
1. Condition  
    (0=Control, 1=Transparency) - 
    
0.50 0.50 
2. Gender (0=male, 1=female)  .06   -     0.62 0.49 
3. Overall perceived transparency -.14  -.06       -     7.34 2.50 
Self-reported expressivity             
4. Self-reported expressivity  .10  .09   .07 -     5.43 0.93 
5. Partner ability to infer emotions   .09    .07   .16* .72**     -    5.75 0.97 
Objective expressivity           
6.  Message length (standardized)  .22*     .03   .05 .40**  .20*     -   0.00 1.00 
7.  Overall affective language use  .06 -   .06   .22* -.13† -.08 -.08     -  7.36 3.62 








Study 1 Dependent Measures (Means and SDs) by Condition. 
 
 
Mtrans (SD) Mcontrol (SD) t(160) p 
Manipulation checks   
 
 
   Focus on partner’s evaluation  4.38 (1.57) 3.63 (1.81) -2.83 .005 
   Perceived transparency 6.99 (2.52) 7.69 (2.43) 1.81 .073 
   Perceived transp. (pos. emotions) 3.20 (2.01) 3.95 (1.90) 2.45 .015 
   Perceived transp. (neg. emotions) 3.16 (1.36) 3.16 (1.39) < .001 1.00 
   Post-writing positive emotions 2.58 (0.86) 2.89 (0.88) 2.19 .030 
   Post-writing negative emotions 2.53 (1.07) 2.14 (1.08) -2.20 .029 
Self-reports of expressivity      
   Self-reported expressivity 5.53 (0.10) 5.34 (0.10) F=1.63 .203 
   Evaluative self-disclosure 5.14 (0.16) 4.71 (0.16) F=3.65 .058 
   Descriptive self-disclosure 4.79 (0.18) 4.62 (0.18) F=0.46 .400 
   Partner ability to infer emotions 5.84 (0.11) 5.66 (0.11) F=1.44 .232 
Objective expressivity     
   Message length 0.21 (1.13) -0.21 (0.68) -2.90  .004 
   Overall affective language use (LIWC) 8.56 (0.44) 7.83 (0.44) F=1.42  .236 
   Positive affect words (LIWC) 4.32 (0.31) 4.18 (0.31) F=0.10 .757 
   Negative affect words (LIWC) 4.24 (0.26) 3.64 (0.26) F=2.56 .111 
   Observer ratings of expressivity 4.55 (1.30) 3.85 (1.11) -3.63  < .001 
 
Note. Self-reported expressivity reflects estimated marginal means obtained from 
ANCOVAS, controlling for chronic expressivity. Objective expressivity word counts 
(LIWC) reflect estimated mean frequencies controlling for word count. F tests of these mean 





         Table 3 
         Study 2 Bivariate Correlations and Descriptive Statistics for Primary Study Variables (Support-Seekers). 
  1   2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Mean SD 
1.   Condition (0=C, 1=T) -         0.53 0.50 
2.   Gender (0=M 1=F) .03   - 
   
    0.50 0.49 
3.   Perceived transparency .17  .13 - 
  
    11.24 4.31 
Self-report variables            
4.   Self-reported expressivity -.13  .02 .30* -      5.29 1.24 
5.   Expressive suppression .20 -.06 -.24* -.49** -     1.78 0.93 
6.   Perceived responsiveness .11  .05 .48** .46** -.42* -    5.78 1.03 
Objective expressivity            
7.   Word count .01  .05 .23† .28* -.18 .22† -   424.49 113.54 
8.  Overall affective words -.09 -.10 .07 .31* -.05 .08 .68** -  26.32 11.92 
Observer ratings            
9.  Expressivity -.01  .18 .07 .22† -.27* .10 .51** .55* - 2.95 1.46 
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Table 4  
Study 2 Support-Seeker Dependent Measures (Means and SDs) by Condition. 
 
Mtrans (SD) Mcontrol (SD) t or F df p 
Manipulation checks   
 
  
   Perceived transparency 11.91 (4.53) 10.48 (4.00) t=-1.35 64 .181 
   Perceived transp. pos. feelings 5.43 (2.05) 5.16 (1.90) t=-0.57 64 .586 
   Perceived transp. neg. feelings 6.49 (3.65) 5.32 (3.28) t=-1.36 64 .180 
   Focus on partner’s evaluation 3.55 (1.79) 2.73 (1.76) t=-1.82 61 .075 
Self-report measures      
   Post-interaction positive mood 5.57 (0.16) 5.55 (0.17) F<0.01 2, 63 .962 
   Post-interaction negative mood 1.51 (0.14) 1.77 (0.15) F=1.57 2, 63 .215 
   Self-reported expressivity 5.17 (0.22) 5.32 (0.24) F=0.18 2, 53 .671 
   Evaluative self-disclosure 5.35 (0.34) 5.32 (0.37) F<0.01 2, 54 .949 
   Descriptive self-disclosure 5.61 (0.28) 5.73 (0.31) F=0.09 2, 54 .769 
   Expressive suppression 1.96 (1.16) 1.66 (0.18) F=1.52 2, 54 .223 
   Perceived partner resp. 5.89 (1.09) 5.66 (0.97) t=-0.90 64 .370 
Objective expressivity (LIWC)      





t=-0.05 55 .964 
   Overall affective language use 25.37 (1.56) 27.53 (1.77) F=0.84 2, 54 .363 
   Positive affective words 17.55 (1.12) 16.67 (1.27) F=0.27 2, 54 .605 
   Negative affective words     7.73 (1.03) 10.79 (1.16) F=3.90 2, 54 .053 
   Frustrating task words    10.31 (1.08) 9.59 (1.22) F=0.20 2, 54 .661 
Observer ratings of expressivity      
   Expressivity    2.94 (1.41) 2.96 (1.56) t=0.05 55 .958 
   Positive emotional tone    2.48 (1.17) 2.19 (0.98) t=-1.02 55 .312 
   Negative emotional tone    2.53 (1.33) 3.08 (1.82) t=1.32 55 .194 
Note. Post-interaction mood reflects estimated marginal means obtained from ANCOVAS, 
controlling for pre-interaction mood. Self-reported expressivity reflects estimated marginal 
means obtained from ANCOVAS, controlling for chronic expressivity. Objective 
expressivity variables (mean word counts) reflect estimated mean frequencies from 
ANCOVAS, controlling for word count. F tests of these mean differences appear in the t 
column, with standard errors in parentheses.   
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Table 5  
Study 2 Support-Provider Dependent Measures (Means and SDs) by Condition. 
 
Mtransp (SD) Mcontrol (SD) t or F df p 
Post-interaction positive mood 5.35 (0.16) 5.18 (0.17) F=0.56 2, 63 .455 
Post-interaction negative mood 1.21 (0.13) 1.47 (0.14) F=1.82 2, 63 .182 
Partner expressivity 5.39 (0.98) 5.04 (1.14) t=-1.33 64 .190 
Partner expressive suppression 1.73 (0.94) 2.03 (0.99) t=1.28 64 .207 
Partner evaluative disclosure 6.26 (0.85) 5.77 (1.23) t=-1.87 64 .066 
Partner descriptive disclosure 5.54 (1.54) 5.68 (1.42) t=0.37 64 .715 
Empathic accuracy (overall) 0.92 (0.06) 1.47 (0.06) F=6.69 2, 63 .012 
Empathic accuracy (pos. emo.) 1.25 (0.11) 1.37 (0.11) F=0.63 2, 63 .430 
Empathic accuracy (neg. emo.) 0.38 (0.07) 0.73 (0.07) F=13.29 2, 63 <.001 
Responsiveness toward partner 5.99 (0.75) 5.79 (0.88) t=-1.00 63 .319 
Note. Post-interaction mood reflects estimated marginal means obtained from ANCOVAS, 
controlling for pre-interaction mood. Means of empathic accuracy reflect estimated marginal 
means of the absolute difference between support-seeker actual emotions and support-
provider inferences, after partialling out the support-seekers’ actual post-interaction 





Table 6  
Study 2 Support-Seekers’ Expressivity Predicting Support-Providers’ Overall Empathic 
Accuracy. 
 
b SE β sr2 t p 
Objective expressivity (LIWC)       
   Word count -.001 <.001 -.23  .05 -1.90 .062 
   Overall affective language use*   .004 .006  .10 .005 0.62 .539 
   Positive affective words*   .003 .008  .06 .003 0.38 .703 
   Negative affective words*  .004 .009  .07 .004 0.50 .622 
   Frustrating task words* -.004   .01 -.08 .004 0.53 .598 
Observer ratings of expressivity       
   Expressivity 0.02 .03 -.06 .003 -0.47 .639 
   Positive emotional tone -.03 .05 -.09 .007 -0.70 .489 
   Negative emotional tone -.005 .03 -.02 <.001 -0.14 .886 
Note. Each row represents a separate regression analysis. Empathic accuracy represents the 
absolute value of the difference between support-seeker actual emotions and support-
provider inferences – lower scores reflect greater accuracy. All analyses control for support-





Table 7  
Study 2 Support-Seekers’ Expressivity Predicting Support-Providers’ Empathic Accuracy of 
Positive Emotions. 
 
b SE β sr2 t p 
Objective expressivity (LIWC)       





-.22   .05 -1.61 .112 
   Overall affective language use*  
 -
.006 
 .01 -.11 .001 -0.60 .550 
   Positive affective words*   -.01  .01 -.17   .02 -1.08 .284 
   Negative affective words* -.004  .02  .05 .001  0.27 .791 
   Frustrating task words*   .001  .02  -.01 <.001 -0.07 .946 
Observer ratings of expressivity       
   Expressivity .004  .06  .01 <.001  0.06 .950 
   Positive emotional tone -.05  .09  -.09   .01 -0.63 .539 
   Negative emotional tone  .02  .06 .06 .003  0.39 .698 
Note. Each row represents a separate regression analysis. Empathic accuracy represents the 
absolute value of the difference between support-seeker actual positive emotions and 
support-provider inferences – lower scores reflect greater accuracy. All analyses control for 






Table 8  
Study 2 Support-Seekers’ Expressivity Predicting Support-Providers’ Empathic Accuracy of 
Negative Emotions. 
 
b SE β sr2 t p 
Objective expressivity (LIWC)       
   Word count <.001 .001  -.04   .001 -0.33 .740 
   Overall affective language use*    .001 .007   .03 <.001  0.17 .866 
   Positive affective words*    .004 .01   .05   .002  0.35 .726 
   Negative affective words* <.001 .01 -.002 <.001 -0.02 .988 
   Frustrating task words*  -.01 .01 -.16   .02 -1.20 .235 
Observer ratings of expressivity       
   Expressivity -.003 .04 -.01 <.001 -0.07 .949 
   Positive emotional tone -.02 .06 -.04   .002 -0.35 .728 
   Negative emotional tone  .02 .04  .04   .002  0.36 .718 
Note. Each row represents a separate regression analysis. Empathic accuracy represents the 
absolute value of the difference between support-seeker actual negative emotions and 
support-provider inferences – lower scores reflect greater accuracy. All analyses control for 





Table 9  
Study 2 Support-Providers’ Empathic Accuracy Predicting Support-Providers’ 
Responsiveness. 
Predictor variable b SE β sr2 t p 
Overall empathic accuracy .004 .27 .002 <.001 0.02 .988 
Empathic accuracy (positive emotions) -.08 .15 -.07 .004 -0.56 .581 
Empathic accuracy (negative emotions) -.007 .21 -.004 <.001 -0.03 .971 
Note. Each row represents a separate regression analysis. All analyses controlled for support-







Table 10  
Study 2 Support-Providers’ Empathic Accuracy Predicting Support-Seekers’ Perceived 
Responsiveness. 
Predictor variable b SE β sr2 t p 
Overall empathic accuracy .22 .29 .09 .003 0.74 .461 
Empathic accuracy (positive emotions) .04 .16 .03 <.001 0.22 .827 
Empathic accuracy (negative emotions) <.001 .24 <.001 <.001 <0.01 .998 
Note. Each row represents a separate regression analysis. All analyses controlled for support-






































Summary of pilot studies 
 
Pilot 1: False feedback 
 In the first pilot, I wrote two bogus questionnaires in which participants (N = 115 
MTurk workers) completed one 5-item version of a “personality inventory,” ostensibly 
designed to measure how people experience emotions. In the “readable” condition, the items 
on the questionnaire assessed the degree to which people feel they sometimes display their 
emotions and sometimes feel their thoughts are readily visible (1 = mostly disagree to 5 = 
mostly agree). This language was designed to encourage participants to more strongly 
endorse each statement, thereby creating the belief that they are more readable. Participants 
in this condition then received false feedback that they are the kind of person whose 
“readability score,” or the degree to which their thoughts and feelings are highly visible to 
others, is above average (at the 72nd percentile). Participants in the “difficult to read” 
condition endorsed items assessing whether people sometimes do not know what they are 
thinking, again to encourage people to say “true” and subsequently feel more difficult to 
read. There was also a no-feedback control group that completed a similar personality 
inventory but did not receive information about their readability score. This manipulation did 
not move around perceptions of transparency. 
Pilot 2: True/false questionnaire  
In this second MTurk study (N = 92), I programmed two true/false questionnaires. 
The transparency condition endorsed ten items that were worded in such a way that they 
would be more likely to rate the statements as “false” and thus feel that their thoughts and 
feelings are more readable. For example, they rated whether it was true or false that “people 
  95
can never see what I’m feeling” or “I never let my feelings show.” By leading people to 
answer “false” more often, I was hoping that the process of denying these statements would 
lead people to believe they are readable. Participants in the control condition completed a 10-
item true/false questionnaire assessing their preferences for neutral stimuli such as coffee 
versus tea or listening to classic versus dance music. This manipulation did not move around 
perceptions of transparency. 
Pilot 3: Perspective-taking manipulation 
 This third pilot study was conducted in the lab and is almost identical to the 
procedure in Study 1. I invited UCSB students (N = 58) to participate in a study about 
communication using various media, and I either asked them to imagine their partner’s 
perspective or did not add additional instructions before asking them to write a letter to a 
close other about a current personal stressor. They were allowed to write to anyone they 
consider “close,” whereas Study 1 was conducted on participants who wrote to their romantic 
partner (although I do not feel strongly that the recipient of the message matters, especially 
since we gave participants the opportunity to nominate a close other of their choosing). The 
perspective-taking instructions marginally increased perceived transparency after writing 
about a treasured memory (p = .09), but not after writing about a stressor. Because this 
manipulation was the only one to move around any measure of perceived transparency across 
the pilot studies, because it was also conducted in the lab in a manner most closely planned 
for Study 1, and because it had been validated in the only other lab study of transparency in 
live interactions among romantic couples (Vorauer & Sucharnya, 2013), I settled for this 
manipulation. 
Pilot 4: Reading an article about transparency 
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In the fourth and final pilot study (N = 70 MTurk workers), I wrote and created 
images of two false New York Times Science articles. Participants in the transparency 
condition read an article called “Other people can read your mind better than you think,” and 
it cited a study by the National Institutes of Mental Health suggesting that most people 
succumb to the transparency bias and believe their thoughts and feelings are more obvious to 
others than they actually are. Participants in the control condition read another faux article 
about another faux cognitive bias, depletion bias, where people overlook how being tired 





Study 1 Perceived Transparency Manipulation Check 
 
This section contains questions about your partner’s insight into your thoughts and feelings.  
 
For each emotion listed below, first consider (just in your own mind) how you would rate 
yourself on each emotion, where 1 = not at all to 10 = extremely.  
 
Then, please indicate whether your partner has an accurate understanding of how well each 
of these emotions describes your emotional state right now.   
 
Would your partner give you the same rating you gave yourself? Please click either "Yes," 
"No," or "I don't know" beside each emotion. 
 
 
 No Yes I don’t know 
Interested    
Distressed    
Excited    
Upset    
Confident    
Happy    
Content    
Uneasy    
Calm    









LIWC Positive Affect Words Dictionary 
bright* definite flirt* grati* 
brillian* definitely fond great 
calm* delectabl* fondly grin 
care delicate* fondness grinn* 
cared delicious* forgave grins 
carefree deligh* forgiv* ha 
careful* determina* free haha* 
cares determined free* handsom* 
caring devot* freeb* happi* 
casual digni* freed* happy 
casually divin* freeing harmless* 
certain* dynam* freely harmon* 
challeng* eager* freeness heartfelt 
champ* ease* flexib* heartwarm* 
charit* easie* frees* heaven* 
charm* easily friend* hero* 
cheer* easiness fun hilarious 
cherish* easing funn* hoho* 
chuckl* easy* genero* honest* 
clever* ecsta* gentle honor* 
comed* efficien* gentler honour* 
comfort* elegan* gentlest hope 
commitment* encourag* gently hoped 
compassion* energ* giggl* hopeful 
compliment* engag* giver* hopefully 
confidence enjoy* giving hopefulness 
confident entertain* glad hopes 
confidently enthus* gladly hoping 
considerate excel* glamor* hug  
contented* excit* glamour* hugg* 
contentment fab glori* hugs 
convinc* fabulous* glory humor* 
cool faith* good humour* 
courag* fantastic* goodness hurra* 
create* favor* gorgeous* ideal* 
creati* favour* grace importan* 
credit* fearless* graced impress* 
cute* festiv* graceful* improve* 
cutie* fiesta* graces improving 
daring fine graci* incentive* 
darlin* flatter* grand innocen* 
dear* flawless* grande* intell* 
inspir* nice* gratef* interest* 
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invigor* openness reward* sweetly 
joke* opportun* rich* sweetness* 
joking optimal* ROFL sweets 
joll* optimi* romanc* talent* 
joy* original romantic* tehe 
keen* outgoing safe* tender* 
kidding painl* satisf* terrific* 
kind palatabl* save thank 
kindly paradise scrumptious* thanked 
kindn* partie* secur* thankf* 
kiss* party* sentimental* thanks 
laidback passion* share thoughtful* 
laugh* peace* shared thrill* 
libert* perfect* shares toleran* 
like play sharing tranquil* 
likeab* played silli* treasur* 
liked playful* silly treat 
likes playing sincer* triumph* 
liking plays smart* true  
livel* pleasant* smil* trueness 
LMAO please* sociab* truer 
LOL pleasing soulmate* truest 
love pleasur* special truly 
loved popular* splend* trust* 
lovely positiv* strength* truth* 
lover* prais* strong* useful* 
loves precious* succeed* valuabl* 
loving* prettie* success* value 
loyal* pretty sunnier valued 
luck pride sunniest values 
lucked privileg* sunny valuing 
lucki* prize* sunshin* vigor* 
lucks profit* super vigour* 
lucky promis* superior* virtue* 
madly proud* support virtuo* 
magnific* radian* supported vital* 
merit* readiness supporting  
merr* ready supportive*  
neat* reassur* supports  
nurtur* relax* suprem*  
ok relief sure*  
okay reliev* surpris*  
okays resolv* sweet  
oks respect  sweetheart*  




LIWC Negative Affect Words Dictionary 
abandon* boring destruct* evil* gross* jerked 
abuse* bother* devastat* excruciat* grouch* jerks 
abusi* broke devil* exhaust* grr* kill* 
ache* brutal* difficult* fail* guilt* lame* 
aching burden* disadvantage fake harass* lazie* 
advers* careless* disagree* fatal* harm lazy 
afraid cheat* disappoint* fatigu* harmed liabilit* 
aggravat* complain* disaster* fault* harmful* liar* 
aggress* confront* discomfort* fear harming lied 
agitat* confus* discourag* feared harms lies 
agoniz* contempt* disgust* fearful* hate lone* 
agony contradic* dishearten* fearing hated longing* 
alarm* crap disillusion* fears hateful* lose 
alone crappy dislike feroc* hater* loser* 
anger* craz* disliked feud* hates loses 
angr* cried dislikes fiery hating losing 
anguish* cries disliking fight* hatred loss* 
annoy* critical dismay* fired heartbreak* lost 
antagoni* critici* dissatisf* flunk* heartbroke* lous* 
anxi* crude* distract* foe* heartless* low* 
apath* cruel* distraught fool* hell luckless* 
appall* crushed distress* forbid* hellish ludicrous* 
apprehens* cry distrust* fought helpless* lying 
argh* crying disturb* frantic* hesita* mad 
argu* cunt* domina* freak* homesick* maddening 
arrogan* cut doom* fright* hopeless* madder 
asham* cynic* dork* frustrat* horr* maddest 
assault* damag* doubt* fuck hostil* maniac* 
asshole* damn* dread* fucked* humiliat* masochis* 
attack* danger* dull* fucker* hurt* melanchol* 
aversi* daze* dumb* fuckin* idiot mess 
avoid* decay* dump* fucks ignor* messy 
awful defeat* dwell* fume* immoral* miser* 
awkward* defect* egotis* fuming impatien* miss 
bad defenc* embarrass* furious* impersonal missed 
bashful* defens* emotional fury impolite* misses 
bastard* degrad* empt* geek* inadequa* missing 
battl* depress* enemie* gloom* indecis* mistak* 
beaten depriv* enemy* goddam* ineffect* mock 
bitch* despair* enrag* greed* inferior*  mocked 
bitter* desperat* envie* grief inhib* mocker* 
blam* despis* envious griev* insecur* mocking 
bore* destroy* envy* grim* insincer* mocks 
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molest* prick* serious stupid* uneas* witch 
mooch* problem* seriously stutter* unfortunate* woe* 
moodi* protest seriousness submissive* unfriendly worr* 
moody protested severe* suck ungrateful* worse* 
moron* protesting shake* sucked unhapp* worst 
mourn* puk* shaki* sucker* unimportant worthless*  
murder* punish* shaky sucks unimpress* wrong* 
nag* rage* shame* sucky unkind yearn* 
nast* raging shit* suffer unlov*  
needy rancid* shock* suffered unpleasant  
neglect* rape* shook sufferer* unprotected  
nerd* raping shy* suffering unsavo*  
nervous* rapist* sicken* suffers unsuccessful*  
neurotic* rebel* sin suspicio* unsure*  
numb* reek* sinister tantrum* unwelcom*  
obnoxious* regret* sins tears upset*  
obsess* reject* skeptic* teas* uptight*  
offence* reluctan* slut* temper useless*   
offend* remorse* smother* tempers vain  
offens* repress* smug* tense* vanity  
outrag* resent* snob* tension* vicious*  
overwhelm* resign* sob terribl* victim*  
pain restless* sobbed terrified vile  
pained revenge* sobbing terrifies villain*  
painf* ridicul* sobs terrify violat*  
paining rigid* solemn* terrifying violent*  
pains risk* sorrow* terror* vulnerab*  
panic* rotten sorry thief vulture*  
paranoi* rude* spite* thieve* war  
pathetic* ruin* stammer* threat* warfare*  
peculiar* sad stank ticked warred  
perver* sadde* startl* timid* warring  
pessimis* sadly steal* tortur* wars  
petrif* sadness stench* tough* weak*  
pettie* sarcas* stink* traged* weapon*  
petty* savage* strain* tragic*  weep*  
phobi* scare* strange trauma* weird*  
piss* stress* trembl* ugh wept  
piti* struggl* trick* ugl* whine*  
pity*  stubborn* trite unattractive whining  
poison* stunk trivi* uncertain* whore*  
prejudic* stunned troubl* uncomfortabl* wicked*  
pressur* stuns turmoil uncontrol* wimp*  






Custom LIWC Dictionary for Frustrating Tasks (Study 2) 
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Personality and Relationship Variables Tested in the Exploratory Analyses 
Avoidant and anxious attachment orientation 
I assessed attachment avoidance (αStudy 1 = .84; αStudy 2 = .81) and anxiety (αStudy 1 = .77; αStudy 2 
= .80) using the Experiences in Close Relationships scale (Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 
1988). 
Chronic self-focus 
To gauge the extent to which participants are usually self-focused, I measured chronic self-
focus using items from the self-monitoring scale (Snyder, 1974) and private and public self-
consciousness scales (Fenigstein, 1984) (αStudy 1 = .84; αStudy 2 = .83). 
Mind-reading expected 
The mind-reading expected subscale from the Relationship Beliefs Inventory (Eidelson & 
Epstein, 1982) is a measure of the degree to which relationship partners believe their 
romantic partner should be able to accurately identify one’s own needs. I used this measure 
to explore whether people who feel transparent were also more likely to assume their partner 
typically knows (or should know) their inner thoughts and feelings (αStudy 1 = .91; αStudy 2 = 
.88). 
Perceived partner responsiveness 
I adapted Reis’s (2003) perceived responsiveness scale to assess chronic perceptions of 
responsiveness from one’s romantic partner (αStudy 1 = .92; αStudy 2 = .90).  
Relationship interdependent self-construal 
I measured relationship interdependent self-construal using Cross, Bacon, and Morris’s 
(2000) relationship interdependent self-construal scale (αStudy 1 = .81). 
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Relationship satisfaction 
To explore whether felt transparency or expressiveness is a function of satisfaction with their 
significant other, I used Hendrick, Dicke, and Hendrick’s (1998) Relationship Assessment 
Scale (αStudy 1 = .91; αStudy 2 = .95). 
Self-esteem 
I assessed self-esteem using Rosenberg’s (1965) 10-item scale (αStudy 1 = .91; αStudy 2  = 
.92). 
Self-other overlap 
I measured self-other overlap using Aron, Aron, Tudor, and Nelson’s (1991) single-item 
Inclusion of Other in the Self scale. 
Support-seeking behavior 
I measured individual differences in self-reported support-seeking tendencies using a 
subscale of Dunkel-Schetter, Feinstein, and Call’s (1986) Social Support Inventory. This 
support-seeking subscale assesses the degree to which people believe they ask for (versus 
conceal) their emotional and tangible support needs (αStudy 1 = .82; αStudy 2  = .86). 
Trait expressivity 
I measured trait expressivity using the 16-item Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire (Gross 
& John, 1997). This scale assesses impulse strength (i.e., active suppression of emotional 
expression), expressivity of negative emotions, and expressivity of positive emotions (αStudy 1  
= .85). 
Trait expressivity to partner 
To assess whether these chronic perceptions of felt transparency also extend to their 
relationship with their partner, I also adapted the trait expressivity scales to gauge felt 
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transparency to the romantic partner in particular (αStudy 1 = .88; αStudy 2  = .82). 
